The Right of Intervention for the Protection of Nationals : Reassessing the Doctrinal Debate by Raby, Jean
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"The Right of Intervention for the Protection of Nationals : Reassessing the Doctrinal Debate"
 
Jean Raby
Les Cahiers de droit, vol. 30, n° 2, 1989, p. 441-493.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/042953ar
DOI: 10.7202/042953ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 13 février 2017 02:01
The Right of Intervention for the Protection 
of Nationals: Reassessing the Doctrinal Debate 
Jean RABY * 
La légalité de l'intervention armée d'un État pour protéger ses ressortissants 
a fait l'objet, depuis plus d'une quinzaine d'années, d'un débat virulent. 
Plusieurs soutiennent qu 'un tel usage de la force est prohibé par la Charte des 
Nations-Unies, d'autres au contraire considèrent qu'il s'agit là de l'exercice 
d'un droit reconnu par le droit international, certains croient enfin qu'un tel 
usage de la force est justifié à titre de légitime défense. 
L'auteur se propose, non pas de relater le débat, mais bien de le replacer 
dans son véritable contexte, en réexaminant et remettant en question plusieurs 
des arguments soulevés d'un côté ou de l'autre. Ceci l'amène à conclure que 
l'ordre juridique international reconnaît en fait l'usage de la force dans un tel 
but : si la légitime défense est rejetée à titre de solution, tant pour des raisons 
d'ordre théorique que pratique, l'usage de la force afin de protéger ses 
ressortissants demeure, pour l'auteur, l'exercice d'un droit reconnu par le 
droit international contemporain. 
L'auteur entend par ailleurs élargir le débat afin d'explorer une option 
qui n'a pas été considérée jusqu'à maintenant par la doctrine mais qui 
fournirait une solution plus satisfaisante que toute autre approche : l'intervention 
d'un État pour protéger ses ressortissants peut se justifier en droit international 
par l'existence, dans un cas particulier, d'un « état de nécessité » tel que défini 
par la Commission du droit international. 
The legality of a forceful intervention by a state to protect its nationals 
has been the subject of a continuing controversy over the past 15 years. Many 
see it as an unlawful use of force prohibited by the Charter of the United 
Nations, others see it as a lawful exercice of a self-standing right recognized 
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under contemporary international law, some finally claim it falls under the 
scope of self-defence. The author proposes not to restate that debate, but 
more to reassess it, examining and challenging some of the arguments raised 
on both sides of the question. Within that debate, it will be concluded that the 
international legal order does indeed recognize the validity of the use of force 
for such a purpose : if the avenue of self-defence is rejected, for conceptual as 
well as practical reasons, the right of intervention to protect nationals is 
indeed, for the author, part of the comtemporary international legal order. 
Then, the author wishes to broaden the debate and proposes another option, 
which has not been explored by scholars and publicists but which is found 
more satisfactory than any other approach : intervention to protect nationals 
can be justified under international law because of the existence, in a 
particular case, of a "state of necessity" as defined by the International Law 
Commission. 
Pages 
1. Intervention to Protect Nationals before 1945 444 
1.1. Intervention to Protect Nationals in Traditional Customary Law 444 
1.2. The Impact of the Kellogg-Briand Pact 446 
2. The Right of Intervention to Protect Nationals and Art. 2(4) of the Charter 447 
2.1. The Doctrinal Controversy 447 
2.1.1. Art. 2(4) as an Absolute Prohibition of the Use of Force 448 
2.1.2. Art. 2(4) as a Qualified Prohibition of the Use of Force 451 
2.2. Interpretation of Art. 2(4) 454 
2.2.1. Rules of Interpretation and Art. 2(4) 454 
2 .2 .1 .1 . Secondary Role of the travaux préparatoires 455 
2.2.1.2. The travaux préparatoires and the Charter 456 
2.2.1.3. Application of the Methods of Interpretation to Art. 2(4) 457 
2.2.2. Contemporary Interpretation of the Charter 458 
2.2.2.1. The Absence of an Effective Collective Security System 460 
2.2.2.2. The Accomplishment of the Purposes of the United Nations 462 
2.3. The Position of the International Court of Justice 463 
2.3.1. The Corfu Channel Case 463 
2.3.2. The Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran 466 
2.3.3. The Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua 467 
2.4. State Practice 469 
2.4.1. The Work of the United Nations 470 
2.4.2. Instances of Actual Intervention by States 473 
J. RABY Ressortissants 443 
3. Intervention for the Protection of Nationals as a Legitimate Exception to the 
Prohibition of the Use of Force 477 
3.1. Self-Defence and Intervention to Protect Nationals 478 
3.2. Necessity and Intervention to Protect Nationals 480 
3.2.1. Necessity as a Circumstance Precluding Wrongfulness 480 
3.2.2. Conditions for the Existance of a State of Necessity 484 
3.2.2.1. Lack of Other Means 484 
3.2.2.2. The Quality of the Interest to be Safeguarded 485 
3.2.2.3. The Nature of the Right Infringed 485 
3.2.3. Intervention to Protect Nationals as Justified by Necessity 486 
3.2.4. Necessity and State Practice 490 
Conclusion 492 
For the past twenty years, use of force in international law has been one 
of the areas most frequently discussed by international lawyers. This abundance 
of literature is due not only to pure scholastic interest but more to the realities 
of the international society, which has witnessed numerous instances of 
actual resort to force. In some of these cases, a state used armed force into 
another state's territory, unilaterally and without seeking consent from the 
territorial authorities, for the alleged purpose of rescuing its nationals facing 
an imminent and grave danger. The legal validity of such a rescue operation 
will be the subject of this paper. 
This analysis will be divided in three parts. First, we will study the state of 
international customary law before 1945, demonstrating that intervention to 
protect nationals was considered legal. 
Second, we sill study the status of intervention to protect nationals, seen 
as a self-standing right, in the post-Charter era. In that respect, the analysis 
will begin by a review of the arguments raised on both sides of the question ; 
thereafter, I will attempt to demonstrate that the main arguments raised to 
deny the existence of the right are incorrect and that, in the end, the present 
nature of the international community and the behaviour of its members all 
point to the necessity of recognizing such a limited right to use force in 
international relations. 
The third and last chapter will deal with intervention to protect nationals 
as a justification for an otherwise illegal use of force. The concept of self-
defence will be rejected for theoretical as well as practical reasons : if force 
used in a rescue operation is to be seen as an exception to the general 
prohibition of armed coercion in the international arena, the best concept 
which could embody and justify it is "necessity". The latter concept has been 
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studied recently by the International Law Commission, and its conclusions 
will be referred to at considerable length. 
1. Intervention to Protect Nationals before 1945 
1.1. Intervention to Protect Nationals in Traditional Customary Law 
There seems to be little doubt that traditional customary international 
law recognized the legal validity of an armed intervention by a state into 
another state's territory in order to protect its nationals : today, there is 
almost unanimity among writers that it was valid under international law 
before 1945'. 
Seen either as a self-standing right, as part of the loosely defined concept 
of self-help, or as a legitimate exercise of a broad right of self-defence, the 
right of intervention to protect nationals was subject to certain clearly defined 
parameters : there had to be an imminent threat of injury to nationals, a 
failure or inability on the part of the territorial sovereign to take appropriate 
measures, and rescue operatioons strictly confined to the object of protecting 
them from injury2. The best evidence of the existence of the right lies in its 
frequent invocation by states as a justification for the use of their armed 
forces abroad3. 
1. See, for example, H. LAUTERPACHT (ed.), OPPEHEIM'S, International law, 8th ed., vol. I, 
London, 1955, p. 309; I. BROWNUE, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 
Oxford, 1963, p. 289 ; P. JESSUP, A Modern Law of Nations, New York, MacMillan, 1948, 
p. 169 ; D. BOWETT, Self-Defence in International Law, 1958, p. 87 ; R. LILLICH, "Forcible 
Self-help by States to Protect Human Rights", (1967-68) 53 Iowa L. Rev. 325, p. 329-330 ; 
C. JOYNER, "The United States Action in Grenada: Relfections on the Lawfulness of 
Invasion", (1984) 78 A.J.I.L. 131, p. 134; M. KNISBACHER, "The Entebbe Operation; A 
Legal Analysis of Israel's Rescue Action", (1977) 12 J.I.L.Econ. 57, p. 59; N. RONZITTI, 
Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of 
Humanity, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985, p. 21 ; H. WALDOCK, "The 
Regulation of the Use of force by Individual States in International Law", (1952-11) 81 
R.C.A.D.I. 455, p. 466-7 ; J.E.S. FAWCETT, "Intervention in International Law", (1961-11) 
103 R.C.A.D.I. 344, p. 404 ; C. HYDE, International Law, 2nd ed., vol. I, Boston, Little 
Brown and Company, 1945, p. 647. 
2. WALDOCK, "Use of Force in International Law", supra, note 1, p. 467; JESSUP, A Modern 
Law of Nations, supra, note 1, p. 169; O. SCH ACTER, "The Right of States to Use Armed 
Force", (1984) 82 Mich. L.R. 1620, p. 1629-30; JOYNER, "U.S. Action In Grenada",supra, 
note 1, p. 135. 
3. WALDOCK, "Use of Force in International Law", supra, note 1, p. 466-7: see also 
BROWNLIE, Use of Force by States, supra, note I, p. 290-1 ; N. RONZITTI, Rescuing 
Nationals Abroad, supra, note 1, p. 21. 
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Some writers, however, have denied that traditional international law 
regulated the right of intervention to protect nationals. Their main argument 
is based on the absence, until 1945, of any meaningful restrictions on the 
ultimate right to go to war. The League of Nations itself did not outlaw war, 
but only war undertaken without following the procedures set up in the 
Covenant4. War being legal, there was thus no need for legal concepts such as 
self-defence and right of intervention to protect nationals : the rationale of 
these concepts is, essentially, to provide states with justifications for an 
otherwise illegal use of force. These concepts were merely political or moral 
justifications to which one should not attach any significance in the development 
of international customary law5. 
It certainly seems strange that international law regulated the use of 
force short of war before achieving the regulation of the ultimate right to go to 
war. However, this absence of a prohibition of the right to go to war should 
not be interpreted in that way. As Dr. Jessup says : 
this apparent paradox should not cause surprise ; it is illustrative of the manner 
in which international law has developed over the centuries in a world of 
sovereign states. The regulation of the resort to war itself constitutes the 
ultimate problem toward the solution of which the world has been groping. 
Along the way it has been possible to secure a measure of agreement on lesser 
problems.6 
One must remember that if the ultimate right to go to war was left 
unrestricted, international law had nevertheless attached legal consequences 
to the existence of a state of war between two or more sovereign states. The 
extensive development of the law of the rights and duties of neutral states in 
one vivid example. On the other hand, self-defence, right of intervention for 
the protection of nationals, self-help were concepts developed to respond to 
certain situations arising in time of peace, in the absence of a legal state of 
war. A use of force in time of peace, which did not respect the conditions 
elaborated by international law, would have been illegal. 
These concepts therefore did have a legal significance, and to try to 
establish a direct and necessary correlation between the prohibition of war 
and the existence of justifications for a limited use of force would be an 
4. D. BOWETT, The Law of International Institutions, 4th ed., London, 1982, p. 17. 
5. J. ZOUREK, "La notion de légitime défense en droit international", (1975) 56 A.I.D.I. 1, 
p. 24; J. DE ARECHAGA, "General Course in Public International Law", (1978-1) 159 
R.C.A.D.I. 1, p. 96-7; J. DELIVANIS, La légitime défense en droit international public 
moderne, Paris, 1971, p. 62 ; J. P. COT and A. PELLET, La Charte des Nations Unies, Paris, 
Éditions Economica, 1985, p. 771 ; R.W. TUCKER (ed.), H. KELSEN, Principles of International 
Law, 2nd. ed., New York, 1966, p. 73. 
6. JESSUP, A Modem Law of Nations, supra, note 1, p. 157. 
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unfortunate misreading of the evolution of international law. The tests and 
conditions which international law established to assess the propriety of 
conduct involving a limited use of force should not be disregarded. 
1.2. The Impact of the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
If, for many publicists, the conclusion of the Charter of the United 
Nations in 1945 represents a turning point in the development of the law of 
the use of force, others maintain that, by 1945, customary international law 
had already undergone profound modifications, especially with regards to 
the right of intervention for the protection of nationals. As the prime 
argument for their position, these scholars invoke the conclusion, in 1928, in 
Paris, of the Kellogg-Briand Pact banning war as an instrument of national 
policy. For Prof. Brownlie, "after the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the instruments 
and practice related to it, a resort to force, whether a state of war existed or 
not, ..., was of very doubtful legality"7. 
Such an interpretation of the Pact, however, is neither supported by a 
reading of the document itself, nor by the interpretation given to it by the 
signatories. If one considers the right of intervention for the protection of 
nationals as a limited measure short of war, it was therefore outside the scope 
of the Pact : what is limited is actual resort to war and not instances of limited 
use of force. The distinction between an act of war and limited use of force 
had already been pointed out in the practice of the League of Nations8. 
Indeed, the United States, the opinion of which should be given great weight 
because it was the leading force behind the signature of the Pact, stated at the 
sixth international conference of American states held in Havana in 1928, 
that... 
it is a principle of international law that [...] a government is fully justified in 
taking action — I would call it interposition of a temporary character — for the 
purpose of protecting the lives and property of its nationals.9 
Moreover, after 1928, there were renewed instances when the right of 
intervention to protect nationals was invoked to justify an armed 
intervention l0. 
Furthermore, if one considers the right of intervention to protect 
nationals as part of the right of self-defence, then there is ample evidence that 
7. BROWNLIE, Use of Force by Stales, supra, note 1, p. 298. 
8. ZOUREK, "La notion de légitime défense", supra, note 5, p. 27-8. 
9. As quoted in R. FALK, "The United States and The Doctrine of Nonintervention in the 
Internal Affairs of Independent States", (1959) 5 How. L.J. 163, p. 177. 
10. See RONZITTI, Rescuing Nationals Abroad, supra, note 1, p. 22. 
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this right was not modified in any way by the Kellogg-Briand Pact". One 
need only look at the statements of states such as France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Japan, South Africa, Poland, Czechoslovakia, all parties to the Pact, 
and which demonstrate, without any doubt, that they considered that the 
scope of the right had not been restricted l2. 
Having thus concluded that an intervention to protect nationals was 
valid under traditional customary international law, we now must consider 
the impact of the Charter of the United Nations. Since an intervention to 
protect nationals is seen by some as a self-standing right and by others as a 
justifiable use of force, both conceptual approaches will be studied, with the 
objective of determining their validity in contemporary international law. 
2. The Right of Intervention to Protect Nationals 
and Art. 2(4) of the Charter 
2.1. The Doctrinal Controversy 
The enactment of the Charter of the United Nations in 1945 proved to be 
the most important event in contemporary international law. Established, as 
it was, at the end of the most devastating conflict in history, the United 
Nations Organization was bound to have as its fundamental objective the 
maintenance of international peace and security. To achieve that end, states 
assumed many obligations, one of which has been at the root of a considerable 
doctrinal controversy : article 2(4) of the Charter, which reads as follows : 
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or 
in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
The effect of this provision has been widely discussed. For some, art. 2(4) 
has established a total and complete prohibition of force in international 
relations. For others, art. 2(4) is a qualified prohibition, which has left 
untouched the right of intervention to protect nationals. We will review 
briefly the arguments raised by both sides. Thereafter, we will examine more 
closely certain legal arguments which demonstrate that intervention to 
11. D. BOWETT, "The Use of Force For the Protection of Nationals Abroad", in A. CASSESE 
(ed.), The Current Regulation of the Use of Force, Dordrecht, 1986, 39, p. 39; Lord 
MCNAIR, Law of Treaties, Oxford, 1961, p. 209-10 ; DELIVANIS, La légitime défense, supra, 
note 5, p. 61 ; J. STONE, Aggression and World Order, London, 1958, p. 32 ; B. V. A. ROLING, 
"On the Prohibition ofthe Use of Force" in A.R. BLACKSHIELD (ed.), Legal Change : Essays 
in Honour of Julius Stone, Sydney, 1983,274, p. 277 ; WRIGHT, "The Meaning ofthe Pact 
of Paris", infra, note 12, p. 54-5. 
12. As quoted in Q. WRIGHT, "The Meaning ofthe Pact of Paris", (1933) 27 A.J.l.L. 39, p. 42-3. 
448 Les Cahiers de Droit ( ' 989) 30 C. de D. 441 
protect nationals, as a self-standing right, is or ought to be recognized in 
contemporary international law. 
2.1.1. Art. 2(4) as an Absolute Prohibition of the Use of Force 
Art. 2(4) of the Charter is seen by many authors as having laid down a 
general prohibition of the use of force in international relations. The only 
exceptions tolerated by international law are the right of self-defence as 
defined by art. 51 of the Charter, and the use of force undertaken pursuant to 
the collective security system set up in Chapter VII of the Charter. 
The legal arguments raised to support this conclusion can, we believe, be 
summarized as follows. First, there is an emphasis on the need to interpret art. 
2(4) in its contextl3. Art. 2(4) is the fundamental provision of an organization 
established "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war"14 and is 
part of an elaborate set of provisions, the objective of which is the maintenance 
of international peace and security15. Being a general principle, it cannot 
suffer a restrictive and literal interpretation which would negate its true 
meaning and content, and which would run counter to the evolution of 
international law since the beginning of the XXth centuryl6. 
The conclusion that art. 2(4) was intended to prohibit the use of force in 
any manner is further reinforced by a careful examination of the travaux 
préparatoires leading to the drafting of art. 2(4). In his treatise International 
Law and the Use of Force by States, Prof. Brownlie rejects any attempt to 
find in the words "against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state" a qualified prohibition which would leave open a resort to force not 
infringing these rights. 
The conclusion warranted by the travaux préparatoires is that the phrase under 
discussion was not intended to be restrictive but, on the contrary, to give more 
specific guarantees to small states and that it cannot be interpreted as having a 
qualifying effect.I7 
13. J.P. COT and A. PELLET, La Charte des Nations- Unies, Paris, 1985, p. 115;K. SKUBISZEWSKI, 
"Use of Force by States" in M. SORENSEN, (ed.), Manual of Public International Law, 
London, 1968, 739, p. 746. 
14. The Charter of the United Nations, preamble. 
15. COT and PELLET, La Charte,supra, note 5, p. 114-5 ; A. VON VERDROSS, "Idées directrices 
de l'Organisation des Nations Unies", (1953 II) 83 R.C.A.D.l. 1, p. 10. 
16. N. RONZITTI, Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on 
Grounds of Humanity, Dordrecht, 1985, p. 18; J. DE ARECHAGA, "General Course in 
Public International Law", (1978-1) 159 R.C.A.D.l. I, p. 87-8; SKUBISZEWSKI, "Use of 
Force by States", supra, note 13, p. 745-6. 
17. BROWNLIE, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford, 1963, p. 267. 
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Support is also found in the celebrated judgment of the International 
Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case. The government of the United 
Kingdom argued that its use of force in the territorial waters of Albania was 
consistent with its Charter obligations since it "threatened neither the territorial 
integrity nor the political independence of Albania"l8. Publicists often refer 
to the following dictum of the Court as clear evidence that this qualified 
interpretation of art. 2(4) was rejected 19. 
To ensure respect for international law, of which it is the organ, the Court must 
declare that the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian 
sovereignty. The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the 
manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most 
serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in international 
organization, find a place in international law.20 
Examination of numerous resolutions21 of the United Nations General 
Assembly reinforces the position adopted by those who have been called "the 
restrictionists"22. The most famous and most important is certainly Res. 
2625-XXV(1970), the latter "devant être considérée comme une interprétation 
de la Charte"23, which states in its first point : 
Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the 
existing international boundaries of another state [...]24 
18. As quoted in DE ARECHAGA, "General Course in Public International Law", supra, note 5, 
p. 90. 
19. See, inter alia, A. PELLET, Droit international public, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1981, p. 123; 
C. ROUSSEAU, "Principes de droit international public", (I958-I) 93 R.C.A.D.I. 371, 
p. 539 ; DE ARECHAGA, "General Course in Public International Law", supra, note 5, p. 90 ; 
B.V. A. RULING, "The Ban on the Use of Force and the U.N. Charter", in A. CASSESE (ed.), 
The Current Regulation of the Use of Force, Dordrecht, 1986, 3, p. 4 ; H. WALDOCK, "The 
Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law", (1952-11) 81 
R.C.A.D.I. 455, p. 493. 
20. Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 3, p. 35. 
21. See, inter alia, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of 
States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 
U.N.G.A.O.R., 20th session, Supp. no. 14, A/6014, p. 11 ; Strict Observance of the 
Prohibition of the Threat or the Use of force in International Relations, and of the Right of 
Peoples to Self-determination, G.A. Res. 2160, U.N.G.A.O.R., 21st session, Supp. no. 16, 
A/6316, p. 4; Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, G.A. Res. 2734, 
U.N.G.A.O.R., 25th session, Supp. no. 28, A/8028, p. 22. 
22. J. D'ANGELO, "Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals : The U.S. Rescue Mission to 
Iran and its Legality under International Law", (1981) 21 Virg. J. Int. Law 485, p. 487. 
23. J. ZOUREK, L'interdiction de l'emploi de la force en droit international, Genève, Institut 
Henry Dunant, 1974, p. 78; see also R. ROSENSTOCK, "The Declaration of Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations", (1970) 64 A.J.L.L. 719; COT and 
PELLET, La Charte, supra, note 5, p. 137. 
24. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 
2625, U.N.G.A.O.R., 25th session, Supp. no. 28, A/8028, p. 121. 
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Res. ES-G/2 (1980), adopted by the General Assembly in January 1980 
with regards to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, seems even more compre-
hensive on this point : 
Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of 
every State is a fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations, any 
violation of which on any pretext whatsoever is contrary to its aims and 
purposes.25 
Furthermore, a qualified interpretation of art. 2(4) would introduce a 
notion of intention which is neither present in the wording and intent of the 
provision nor desirable in the present state of international relations26. Res. 
3314-XXIX (1974), which defined the concept of "aggression", is seen as 
supporting that view27 : 
Art. 1. Agression is the use of force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or in any manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. 
Art. 5. No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, 
military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression.28 
The addition of the term sovereignty, alongside the terms "territorial 
integrity" and "political independence", is interpreted as putting an end to the 
controversy29: it "represents an additional safeguard which could compel 
even a mere entry into foreign territory to be considered as an act of 
aggression"30. 
The final words of art. 2(4), "or in any manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations" are also denied any qualifying effect. Prof. 
Brownlie again points out that, according to the travaux préparatoires, the 
phrase was not intended to have any restrictive meaning31 : "indeed it was 
probably meant to reinforce the prohibition of paragraph 4"32. In that 
25. As quoted in G. CAJA, "Jus Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention", ( 1981—III) 172 
RCA.DJ. 271, p. 294. 
26. DE ARECHAGA, "General Course in Public International Law", supra, note 5, p. 89 and 
p. 91 ; P. REUTER, Droit international public, 5th ed., Paris, 1976, p. 440. 
27. C. EUSTATHIADÈS, "La définition de l'agression adoptée aux Nations-Unies et la légitime 
défense", (1975) 28 R. hell. Dr. Int. 5, p. 52. 
28. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N.G.A.O.R., 29th session, Supp. no. 31, A/ 
9631, p. 142. 
29. COT and PELLET, La Charte, supra, note 5, p. 124. 
30. RONZITTI, Rescuing Nationals Abroad, supra, note 1, p. 8. 
31. BROWNLIE, Use of Force by States, supra, note 1, p. 268, note 6. 
32. Id., p. 268. 
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respect, Prof. Wehberg recalls the declaration of the American delegate at the 
San Francisco Conference : 
On peut enfin se référer aux déclarations du délégué américain [...] selon 
lesquelles l'intention des auteurs de la Charte fut "de déclarer, dans les termes 
les plus généraux, une interdiction absolue et sans restriction"; pour le délégué 
américain, la phrase "ou de toute autre manière" devait garantir.,, "qu'il n'y 
aurait pas de lacunes". " 
One should also take into account the fact that the prime purpose of the 
United Nations is the maintenance of international peace and security : any 
unilateral use of force is contrary to the purposes and objectives of the United 
Nations34, is a breach of the peace and entails the possibility of a generalized 
conflict35. 
Finally, if human rights are of a prime interest for the United Nations, it 
must be remembered that their promotion and protection are nevertheless 
best ensured through respect for the fundamental objective of the Charter36 : 
The primary place ascribed to international peace and security is natural, since 
the fulfillment of the other purposes will be dependent upon the attainment of 
that basic condition.37 
2.1.2. Art. 2(4) as a Qualified Prohibition of the Use of Force 
If a great number of international lawyers consider that the right of 
intervention for the protection of nationals has been prohibited by the 
enactment of art. 2(4), numerous other publicists have adopted a different 
position. For these publicists, art. 2(4) has laid down a qualified prohibition 
of the use of force : the right of intervention to protect one's nationals would 
not contravene that provision if it is kept within the conditions for its exercise. 
[...] it may be noted that Article 2, paragraph 4, is not an absolute prohibition of 
the use of force. If force can be used in a manner which does not threaten the 
territorial integrity or political independence of a state, it escapes the restriction 
of the first clause.38 
33. H. WEHBERG, "L'interdiction du recours à la force", (1951-1) 78 R.C.A.D.I. 1, p. 70. 
34. P. JESSUP, A Modem Law of Nations, New York, 1948, p. 169. 
35. ROLING, "The Ban on the Use of Force", supra, note 11, p. 7; WEHBERG, supra, note 5, 
"L'interdiction du recours à la force", supra, note 33, p. 71. 
36. DE ARECHAGA, "General Course in Public International Law", supra, note 5, p. 91. 
37. Advisory Opinion concerning Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J.Rep. 
151, p. 168. 
38. JESSUP, A Modem Law of Nations, supra, note I, p. 162. 
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The use of force is not condemned per se39, "mais en raison des fins 
poursuivies"40, i.e. against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations. Such interpretatioon is much more consistent with the text of art. 
2(4)4I ; as Prof. Schacter said, "if these words are not redundant, they must 
qualify the all-inclusive prohibition against force"42. Indeed, it can even be 
maintained that such an approach to the interpretation of art. 2(4) is also 
"consonant with the historical development of attempts to limit the right of 
States to resort to war"43 and the intention of the drafters. 
We know that the principle [art. 2(4)] was intended to outlaw war in its classic 
sense, that is, the use of military force to acquire territory or other benefits from 
another state.44 
The interests protected by article 2(4) are "territorial integrity" and 
"political independence". Political independence refers to the freedom enjoyed 
by states in their decision-making ; territorial integrity refers to the control a 
state exercises over a geographical area45. The use of force against these 
interests suggests the deployment of an important contingent of armed forces, 
to which it is difficult to resist46. 
What is therefore protected by art. 2(4) is not territorial inviolability47 : 
"integrity may be preserved even though there is a limited armed foray into a 
state's territory by another state"48. The intervention by a state to protect its 
nationals is, in essence, an intervention limited in time, in purpose and in 
scope. Thus, it cannot, assuming it stays within the limits and conditions set 
39. D.W. BOWETT, "The Use of Force in the Protection of Nationals", ( 1957) 43 Grotius Society 
111, p. 113 ; J. STONE, Agression and World Order, London, 1958, p. 43 ; D.P. O'CONNELL, 
International Law, 2nd ed., vol. I, London, 1970, p. 307. 
40. M. VIRALLY, "Panorama de droit international" (1983-V) 183 R.C.A.D.I. 13, p. 102. 
41. STONE, Aggression and World Order, supra, note 39, p. 95 ; L.C. GREEN, "Humanitarian 
Intervention — 1976 Version", (1976) 24 Chilly's L.J. 217, p. 222; M. KNISBACHER, "The 
Entebbe Operation: A Legal Analysis of Israel's Rescue Action", (1977) \2J.I.L.Econ. 57, 
p. 60; A. JEFFERY, "The American Hostages in Tehran; The l.C.J. and the Legality of 
Rescue Missions", (1981) 30 I.C.L.Q. 717, p. 725. 
42. O. SCHACHTER, "The Right of States to Use Force", (1984)82 Mich. L. Rev. 1620, p. 1625. 
43. JEFFERY, "The American Hostages in Tehran", supra, note 41, p. 726 ; GREEN, "Humanitarian 
Intervention", supra, note 41, p. 219. 
44. SCHACTER, "Right of States to Use Force", supra, note 42, p. 1624. 
45. M. MCDOUGAL and F. FEUCIANO, Law and Minimum World Public Order, New Haven, 
1961, p. 177. 
46. VIRALLY, "Panorama de droit international", supra, note 40, p. 102. 
47. A. D'AMATO, International Law: Process and Prospect, New York, 1987, p. 37; L. SALTER, 
"Commando Coup at Entebbe: Humanitarian Intervention or Barbaric Aggression", 
(1977) 11 Int. Lawyer 331, p. 334. 
48. D'AMATO, International Law, supra, note 47, p. 37. 
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out by international law, violate the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state49. Prof. Leonard Salter, who applied this statement to the rescue 
operation by Israeli forces at Entebbe airport, in 1976, concluded : 
Since the entire escapade lasted less than one hour, and its objective was solely 
to liberate imprisoned civilians whose lives were in danger, merely to pose the 
question provides the answer. There was nothing in that country that the Israelis 
wanted except the return of the captives delivered there by the hijackers. Nor did 
it appear to the Ugandans at any time that the rescue party had any other 
interests in mind.50 
In that respect, it is striking to note than none of the proponents of the 
restrictionist view have denied that proposition. What restrictionists argue is 
that force is prohibited per se : they do not say that intervention to protect 
nationals, implying as it does the use of armed force on another state's 
territory, violates the territorial integrity and/or political independence of 
that state. 
Moreover, intervention to protect nationals is not only compatible with 
the purposes of the United Nations, but also constitutes an upholding of 
them51. The preamble of the Charter as well as art. 1, 55, 56 underline that 
respect for human rights is a fundamental objective that every member should 
promote52. Indeed, some authors argue that the protection of human rights is 
49. O'CONNELL, International Law, supra, note 39, p. 304 ; R. LILLICH, "Forcible Self-Help by 
States to Protect Human Rights", (1967-8) 53 Iowa L. Rev. 325, p. 336 ; D'ANOELO, "Resort 
to Force by States to Protect Nationals", supra, note 22, p. 499 ; J.N. MOORE, "Grenada 
and the International Double Standard", (1984) 78 A.J.I.L. 145, p. 154; E. PÉREZ-VERA, 
"La protection d'humanité en droit international", [1969] R.B.D.I. 401, p. 420-1 ; D'AMATO, 
International law, supra, note 47, p. 37 ; D. BOWETT, "The Use of Force for The Protection 
of Nationals Abroad", in A. CASSESE, (ed.), The Current Regulation of the Use of Force, 
Dordrecht, 1986, 39, p. 40 ; JEFFERY, "The American Hostages in Tehran", supra, note 41, 
p. 725 ; S. DAVIDSON, Grenada: A study in Politics and the Limits of International Law, 
Aldershot, 1987, p. 113 ; VON VERDROSS, "Idées directrices de l'ONU", supra, note 15, p. 
14; JESSUP, A Modern Law of Nations, supra, note 1, p. 169. It should be noted that Dr. 
Jessup and Dr. Von Verdross nevertheless conclude that the use of force to protect 
nationals is inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
50. SALTER, "Commando Coup at Entebbe", supra, note 47, p. 336-7. 
51. MOORE, "Grenada and the International Double Standard", supra, note 49, p. 154 ; PEREZ-
VERA, "La protection d'humanité en droit international", supra, note 49, p. 415 ; JEFFERY, 
"The American Hostages in Tehran", supra, note 41, p. 726. 
52. D'ANOELO, "Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals", supra, note 22, p. 493-4 ; 
C. D E VISSCHER, Théories et réalités en droit international public, 3rd ed., Paris, 1960, 
p. 158-68; O'CONNELL, International Law, vol.1, supra, note 39, p. 318. 
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now an active duty for every member of the international community53. It is 
therefore possible, as Prof. Julius Stone does, to argue that... 
a threat or use of force employed consistently with these purposes, and not 
directed against the "territorial integrity or political independence of any state", 
may be commendable rather than necessarily forbidden by the Charter.54 
An intervention to protect nationals is justified by the sheer urgency of 
the situation and its purpose is solely to protect innocent lives55. As Prof. 
Bowett writes : 
in a treaty which is marked by its affirmation of faith in human rights, it would 
be a curious conclusion if State action to protect the lives of its nationals, even 
within the boundaries of another State, were inconsistent with the purposes of 
the treaty.56 
Finally one should consider also the context in which such interventions 
take place. Experience shows that they usually become necessary when 
terrorists are threatening the lives of innocent people, their only flaw being 
citizens of a particular state. International terrorism represents today the 
greatest threat to international peace and security : as it will be shown later 
on, any action which is in keeping with the struggle against international 
terrorism can only, in the long term, be beneficial to the maintenance of world 
peace. 
2.2. Interpretation of Art. 2(4) 
2.2.1. Rules of Interpretation and Art. 2(4) 
We have seen that one of the main controversies surrounding the 
interpretation of art. 2(4) lies in the significance to be given to the words 
"against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations". The 
chief argument for supporting the restrictionist view lies in historical consid-
erations : recourse to the travaux préparatoires enable these scholars to 
interpret the wording of art. 2(4) in a more liberal way than the text would 
normally allow for. 
53. T. SCHWEISFURTH, "Operations to Rescue Nationals in Third States involving the Use of 
Force in Relation to the Protection of Human Rights", (1980) 23 German Y.B.I.L. 159, 
p. 170-2, p. 179; M. MCDOUCAL and S. REISMAN, "Response by Professors McDougal 
and Reismann", (1968-9) 3 Int. Lawyer 438, p. 444; F. TESON, "Le peuple c'est moi ! The 
World Court and Human Rights", (1987) 81 A.J.I.L. 173, p. 175. 
54. STONE, Aggression and World Order, supra, note 39, p. 43. 
55. SCHACTER, "Right of States to Use Force", supra, note 42, p. 1632 ; BOWETT, "The Use of 
Force For the Protection of Nationals Abroad", in Cassese, supra, note 11, p. 40. 
56. BOWETT, "The Use of Force in the Protection of Nationals", in Grotius Society, p. 114. 
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À la vérité, l'interprétation non seulement plausible, mais normale du texte de la 
Charte selon laquelle l'emploi de la force reste licite s'il n'est pas dirigé "contre 
l'intégrité territoriale ou l'indépendance politique" d'un État n'a pas été 
retenue. La raison en est que cette interprétation ne concorde pas du tout avec 
les intentions des auteurs de la Charte.57 (My underlines) 
The use of the travaux préparatoires is recognized as a legitimate 
technique of interpretation in public international law : but the relevance of 
the historical considerations surrounding the drafting of the provision is to be 
questioned in the case of art. 2(4). This will become evident after examining 
the following propositions : the secondary character given by international 
law to the use of travaux préparatoires when compared with other methods of 
interpretation, the inadequacy of recourse to preparatory work when interpreting 
a document such as the Charter, and the application of other methods of 
interpretration to art. 2(4) itself. 
2.2.1.1. Secondary Role of the travaux préparatoires 
In the Case concerning Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership 
in the United Nations (1948), the International Court of Justice discussed the 
use of the travaux préparatoires as a tool of interpretation. 
The Court considers that the text is sufficiently clear ; consequently, it does not 
feel that it should deviate from the consistent practice of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice, according to which there is no occasion to resort to 
preparatory work if the text of a convention is sufficiently clear in itself.58 
The secondary character given by the Court to the use of travaux 
préparatoires as a tool of interpretation was recognized by the Vienna 
Convention on the law of Treaties (1969)59. Both the Convention and the 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice therefore relegate the 
travaux préparatoires to a secondary role60. If the fundamental objective of 
any method of interpretation remains the ascertainment of the intention of 
the parties, its focus lies in the determination of the parties' intentions as 
expressed in the document6I : "the text is the expression of the intention of the 
57. E. GIRAUD, "L'interdiction du recours à la force: la théorie et la pratique des Nations-
Unies", (1963) R.G.D.I.P. 501, p. 512. 
58. [1947-8]/. C.J. Rep. 57, p. 63 ; see also Advisory Opinion concerning the Competence of the 
General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, [1950] I.C.J. 4, p. 8. 
59. (1980) 1155 United Nations Treaty Series 332. 
60. I. SINCLAIR, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd ed., Manchester, p. 141. 
61. I. BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, 3rd ed., Oxford, 1979, p. 624; 
P. REUTER, Introduction au droit des traités, Genève, Librairie Armand Colin, 1986, p. 85. 
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parties... and it is to that expression of intent that one must first look"62. The 
use of travaux préparatoires is ancillary63 : "il faut faire autant que possible 
abstraction des travaux préparatoires"64. Therefore, contrary to the approach 
adopted by restrictionists, recourse to the travaux préparatoires cannot take 
precedence over an analysis of the text of art. 2(4) itself. 
2.2.1.2. The travaux préparatoires and the Charter 
The interpretation of an international document like the Charter raises 
additional particular considerations. When one deals with a bilateral treaty, a 
traité-contrat, the interpretation method is more subjective, and greater 
recourse will be made to elements outside the text of the treaty. 
However, the Charter is not a traité-contrat : it is more in the nature of a 
traité-loi65, as it was negotiated by a great number of states and it has 
established elaborate and far-reaching rules designed to have universal 
relevance and to attract general acceptance by the community of states66. 
Because of the very nature of a general multilateral convention as a traité-loi, 
the ascertainment of the original intention of the drafters is a much more 
arduous task and is not as relevant as in a bilateral treaty. Indeed, it may very 
well be impossible to determine an intention common to all the parties : a 
compromise is reached, not on the basis of wishes expressed by the parties, 
not on a "meeting of the minds", but through the actual text of a provision. 
The text thus becomes the only objective element which has created a 
consensus and by which states have agreed to be bound67. 
Moreover, a traité-loi like the Charter appeals to universal adherence. 
Can we oppose the travaux préparatoires to states which did not participate 
in the drafting of the provisions ? States which, in fact, acceded to the Charter 
"not on the basis of what the original negotiators intended but rather on the 
basis of what the text actually says and means"68. 
I would quote to the same effect Judge Sir Percy Spender, who delivered 
a separate opinion in the Advisory Opinion concerning Certain Expenses of 
62. SINCLAIR, Vienna Convention, supra, note 60, p. 131 ; see also Lord MCNAIR, The Law of 
Treaties, Oxford, 1961, p. 365. 
63. NGUYEN Q.D., P. DALLIER, A. PELLET, Droit international public, 2nd ed., Paris, 1980, p. 
249; REUTER, Droit des traités, supra, note 61, p. 85-6; BROWNLIE, Public International 
Law, supra, note 61, p. 627-8. 
64. P. GUGGENHEIM, Traité de droit international public, vol. I, Genève, 1953, p. 133. 
65. C. ROUSSEAU, Droit international public, vol. I, Paris, Sirey, 1971, p. 68-9. 
66. M. SHAW, International Law, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 1986, p. 78-81. 
67. ROUSSEAU, Droit international public, supra, note 65, p. 294. 
68. SINCLAIR, Vienna Convention, supra, note 60, p. 130-1. 
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the United Nations (1962), and who discussed specifically this question of 
recourse to travaux préparatoires in the interpretation of the Charter : 
It is hardly the intention of those States which originally framed the Charter 
which is important except as that intention reveals itself in the text. What is 
important is what the Charter itself provides ; what — to use the words of 
Article 4 [of the Charter] — is "contained in [...] the Charter".69 
Of course, one could point out that states should consult the preparatory 
work before acceding to a multilateral treaty. But other shortcomings flow 
from the character of the travaux préparatoires itself. Preparatory documents 
are not clearly defined, are not authentic documents and are often confused 
and deficient70. Being not integrated, extending over a long period of time, 
they sometimes ignore in a later phase of the negotiations motives, intentions, 
declarations which were, at the outset of the negotiations, of extreme 
importance for the drafting of a particular provision. If these shortcomings 
are of the essence of preparatory documents, they are more acute in the case 
of multilateral treaties, because of the number of states involved in the 
negotiating process71. 
In the interpretation of art. 2(4), it therefore seems clear that the travaux 
préparatoires should not be given the importance attributed to them by the 
restrictionists. Reliance on the text is to preferred, and even the subsequent 
attitude of the parties is to be given more weight. Let us apply these methods 
to art. 2(4). 
2.2.1.3. Application of the Methods of Interpretation to Art. 2(4) 
A provision in an international document is to be interpreted by "first 
considering] the terms of that article"72; "if the relevant words in their 
natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is the end of 
the matter"73. Applying this principle to art. 2(4), one cannot but give to the 
words "territorial integrity or political independence" a significance : otherwise, 
they would be redundant74. 
69. Expenses Case, p. 184-5. 
70. REUTER, Droit des traités, supra, note 61, p. 86; NGUYEN and al., Droit international 
public, supra, note 63, p. 249; SINCLAIR, Vienna Convention, supra, note 60, p. 142. 
71. BROWNLIE, Public International law, supra, note 61, p. 627-8. 
72. Advisory Opinion concerning Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the 
United Nations, [1948] I.C.J. Rep., 4, p. 62. 
73. Advisory Opinion concerning the Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission 
of a State to the United Nations, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 4, p. 8; see also Advisory Opinion 
concerning the Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 
[1950] I.C.J. Rep. 221, p. 227 ; Asylum Case, [1950] I.C.J.Rep. 266, p. 279. 
74. SCHACTER, "Right of States to Use Force", supra, note 42, p. 1625. 
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As article 31 of the Vienna Convention also provides, the interpretation 
must take into account the subsequent practice of the parties. We will see later 
on that the practice of the members of the United Nations is, to a great extent, 
consistent with this interpretation. 
Does this lead to an absurd, obscure or ambiguous result, which would 
therefore open the recourse to the travaux préparatoires! We think not. Of 
course, one could argue that whenever there is a dispute, this is because there 
is an ambiguity75. But, if that were so, there would be not point in restricting 
recourse to the travaux préparatoires to the existence of an ambiguity or an 
unreasonable result : recourse to interpretation rules only becomes relevant 
when there is a disagreement. The ambiguity or absurdity must therefore still 
be prevailing after step one, i.e. interpreting the text of the provision in good 
faith, by attributing to the words their ordinary and natural sense. The 
qualified interpretation of art. 2(4) leads neither to an absurd result nor does 
it lead to an ambiguous situation : force is to be prohibited when directed 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
Of course, there could be an ambiguity arising from the particular 
application of this rule to the right of intervention for the protection of 
nationals. But, as we have seen, even the restrictionists generally have not 
denied that the use of force for the protection of nationals, if kept within the 
limits defined by internatinal law, does not contravene these attributes. The 
ultimate conclusion must therefore be that restrictionists cannot rely on the 
travaux préparatoires to justify their interpretation of art. 2(4). 
Moreover, some scholars rely on the so-called principle of effectiveness, 
to justify their interpretation of art. 2(4)76. This principle requires one to give 
every word in a provision its full meaning, but not to extend it. Applying it to 
art. 2(4), the words "territorial integrity", "political independence", "purposes 
of the United Nations" are to be given their full meaning, but nothing more. 
This is exactly the result of the qualified view of art. 2(4). 
2.2.2. Contemporary Interpretation of the Charter 
In analysing the relevancy of preparatory works in the interpretation of 
art. 2(4), the rules of treaty interpretation which international law has 
developed were briefly reviewed. In this sub-chapter, however, I wish to 
emphasize a more global vision of the Charter. 
75. THIERRY and al., Droit international public, 4e éd., Paris, Montchrestien, 1984, p. 165; 
BROWNLIE, Use of Force by States, supra, note 1, p. 267. 
76. See, inter alia, SKUBiszEwsK!,"Use of Force by States", supra, note 13, p. 746; BROWNLIE, 
Use of Force by States, supra, note 1, p. 268. 
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The drafters of the Charter had no intention of putting together a 
constitutional document which would be frozen in time. Far from that, they 
recognized that the Charter should not be established in a vacuum, cut off 
from the anarchical international order it attempts to regulate. They had 
more a vision of a pact between members of the international society, an 
understanding which would both influence and respond to their needs and the 
needs of the international community as a whole. 
Being a constitutional document, the Charter is a "living" treaty, which 
evolves with time and in accordance with the developments of the international 
order. Far from being static, the Charter can be adapted to new circumstances, 
so that it can be made to respond to situations that were unforeseen at the 
time of its enactment. These are considerations to keep in mind when one 
analyses the content of the norms contained in the Charter. 
In the interpretation of a multilateral treaty such as the Charter [...] there are 
particular considerations to which regard should [...] be had [...] Its provisions 
were of necessity expressed in broad and general terms. It attempts to provide 
against the unknown, the unforeseen and, indeed, the unforeseeable. Its text 
reveals that it was intended [...] to endure, at least it was hoped it would endure, 
for all time. It was intended to apply to varying conditions in a changing and 
evolving world community and to a multiplicity of unpredictable situations and 
events. Its provisions were intended to adjust themselves to the ever changing 
pattern of international existence.77 
The International Court of Justice has recognized the importance, in the 
interpretation of international legal instruments, of giving specific attention 
to the conditions prevailing in the contemporary international legal order. In 
the Advisory Opinion concerning the Legal Consequences of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (1971), the Court was called upon to 
interpret the Covenant of the League of Nations, drafted in 1919-20. 
[...] the Court is bound to take into account the fact that the concepts embodied 
[...] were not static [...] [A]n international instrument has to be interpreted and 
applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of 
the interpretation78. 
When interpreting the Charter, one must thus take into account the 
global legal framework regulating internatinal society at the time of the 
interpretation. Prof. Schwarzenberger, discussing the interpretation to be 
given to article 51 of the Charter, emphasized this point : 
[...] any interpretation of Article 51 must take into consideration the actual state 
of this [international] quasi-order in the concrete circumstances which may fall 
77. Expenses Case, p. 185 (Individual opinion of Judge Sir Percy Spender). 
78. Advisory Opinion Concerning the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia, [1971] I.C.J. Rep. 16, p. 31 ; also the Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf Case, [1978] I.C.J.Rep. 4, p. 33. 
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for consideration and, accordingly, must vary in strictness and liberality of 
construction.79 
It is submitted that this consideration of the existing international legal 
order cannot but lead one to the conclusion that the right of intervention for 
the protection of nationals is consistent with art. 2(4). The arguments behind 
both positions have been reviewed and it has been shown that the arguments 
supporting the vision of art. 2(4) as an absolute prohibition of the use of force 
are, as a matter of pure legal analysis, incorrect. I now wish to show that the 
qualified interpretation of art. 2(4) is the preferable one, because of the 
present state of the international legal order. 
We do not deny that, as a matter of exegesis, the extreme view of the prohibition 
of force in Article 2(4) is possible. We do question whether, even in terms of 
exegesis, it is the only possible, or even the more likely view ; and whether in the 
light of the absurdities and injustice to which it would lead, it must not be 
regarded as an incorrect one.80 
2.2.2.1. The Absence of an Effective Collective Security System 
To interpret art. 2(4) as an absolute prohibition of the use of force is very 
simple and very easy. It may be true that, in the logic of the United Nations, 
unilateral use of force should be unnecessary and illegal, because the Charter 
has set up a collective security system which deprives it from any usefulness. 
However, such a conclusion is no longer valid, since the system has so 
blatantly failed to fulfill its promises. 
If states agreed, in 1945, to renounce the right to use force under art. 2(4), 
they did so on the understanding that a centralized collective security system 
would be set up and would effectively punish any violation of the international 
order. There was an indivisible link between what Prof. Combacau has called 
the "rule", art. 2(4), and the "guarantee", the collective security system : they 
went together, "and the success of the latter was a necessary condition for 
respect of the former"8I. To interpret art. 2(4) without considering and giving 
due weight to that factual situation, is, as Prof. Stone said, a position which 
"makes [njeither moral, political or even legal sense"82. 
La démarche n'est pas seulement curieuse; elle est aussi erronée, tant il est 
impossible de construire l'interdiction du recours à la force, et les exceptions 
79. G. SCHWARZENBEROER, "Fundamental Principles of International Law", (1955-1) 87 
R.C.A.D.l. 191. 
80. STONE, Aggression and World Order, supra, note 11, p. 97. 
81. J. COM BACAU, "The Exception of Self-Defence in U.N. Practice", in A. CASSESE,(ed.), The 
Current Regulation of the Use of Force, Dordrecht, 1986, p. 30. 
82. STONE, Aggression and World Order, supra, note 11, p. 100. 
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qu'elle autorise, en fonction d'un mécanisme de sécurité dont l'expérience a 
prouvé qu'il était sans efficacité.83 
This absence of an effective collective security system in the contemporary 
international order becomes an even more compelling justification when one 
considers the prime purpose lying behind the existence of the right of 
intervention to protect nationals, i.e. the safeguarding of human lives. 
Protecting human rights is now a prime concern for the international 
community. But international organization has proved unable to provide a 
mechanism which would act with the speed and efficiency requisite to save 
threatened lives and uphold fundamental human rights. We need, now, in 
1988, to interpret (or reinterpret) the Charter in a way which would ensure at 
least a measure of unilateral resort to force by a state for the purpose of 
safeguarding the lives of its nationals84. Indeed, as far back as 1948, Prof. 
Jessup wrote : 
It would seem that the only possible argument against the substitution of 
collective measures under the Security Council for individual measures by a 
single state would be the inability of the internatinal organization to act with the 
speed requisite to preserve life85. 
It would be ironic, indeed, if human rights are less protected after the 
enactment of the Charter than before it. But this is exactly the result to which 
an absolute view of article 2(4) leads : 
[...] from a practical point of view it would seem that the Charter encumbers 
rather than advances the human rights and fundamental freedoms involved in 
the protection of aliens abroad.86 
Since there is no effective international machinery, and since self-defence 
is being restricted to the existence of an armed attack, an aggression armée, 
states face the cruel dilemma of having to choose between a respect of 
inflexible and Utopian rules of law which offer no immediate solution, 
passivity which "would be politically foolish and unrealistic"87, and the more 
compelling duty that every state would feel towards its threatened nationals. 
Surely to require a state to sit back and watch the slaughter of innocent people in 
order to avoid violating blanket prohibitions against the use of force is to stress 
blackletter [sic] at the expense of far more fundamental values.88 
83. J. VERHOEVEN, "Le droit, le juge et la violence", (1987) 91 R.G.D.I.P. 1159, p. 1220. 
84. O'CONNELL, International Law, supra, note 39, p. 304. 
85. JESSUP, A Modem Law of Nations, supra, note 11, p. 170; see also H. WALDOCK (ed.), 
J. BRIELY, The Law of Nations, Oxford, 1963, p. 428. 
86. A. THOMAS and A. THOMAS, Non-intervention, Dallas, 1956, p. 312. 
87. BOWETT, "Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad", supra, note 11, p. 45. 
88. LILLICH, "Forcible Self-help", supra, note 1, p. 344. 
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The right of intervention to protect nationals, if exercised within the 
limits recognized by international law, becomes the only means by which a 
state can effectively bring assistance to its citizens facing an imminent danger. 
It is a rational response, proportionate and legitimate, which is morally right 
and politically realistic, and, by upholding fundamental rights, can only 
benefit the entire international community in the long term. 
2.2.2.2. The Accomplishment of the Purpose of the United Nations 
One should also consider the context in which the right to protect 
nationals is usually exercised. As we have pointed out previously, these 
operations usually take place where international terrorism has struck. 
International terrorism was a phenomenon unknown in 1945. Since the 
drafting of the Charter, the advent of the nuclear era has brought stability 
between the main players in the international game. However, the necessary 
restraint that states possessing nuclear weapons have manifested, because of 
the consequences of their use, has enabled third states to challenge the 
stability of the international order through the use of a different form of 
warfare : terrorism. State-sponsored terrorism has thus flourished, protected 
as it was from effective retaliatory responses from the target states because of 
the consequences of any attempt by them to react. 
Indeed, those states involved in terrorist activities, which are now the less 
respectful members of the international legal order, have found comfort in 
that same legal order they seek to destroy. Through an idealistic interpretation 
of international law in general and the Charter in particular, they can 
condemn any rational attempt by the victim states to react and discourage 
such actions, victim states which are then faced with an interpretation of the 
Charter which leaves them no alternative and which "may result in turning 
the right of political independence into little more than a sham"89. 
It cannot be stated too emphatically that international terrorism today 
represents the greatest threat to international peace and security. One needs 
only to folio w the course of contemporary events to realize that it contains the 
seeds of a generalized conflict. Any action which tends to discourage such 
behaviour, if it can present some immediate risks for the stability of the 
international order, can only, in the long term, be beneficial for the maintenance 
of interenational peace and security, which is the fundamental purpose of the 
United Nations. 
89. R.W. TUCKER, "Reprisals and Self-Defense : The Customary Law", (1972) 66 A.J.I.L. 586, 
p. 594. 
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To conclude, we would simply restate the dilemma which Prof. Brownlie 
formulated in 1963. For him, forcible intervention was to be outlawed, 
because... 
[...] the possible risks of denying the legality of action in a case of such urgency, 
an exceptional circumstance, must be weighted against the more calculable 
dangers of providing legal pretexts for the commission of breaches of the peace 
in the pursuit of national rather than humanitarian interests.90 
In 1988, in the light of the contemporary events, the dilemma should be 
reformulated otherwise. The possible risks to the stability of the international 
order, in the short term, of allowing such an intervention must be weighted 
against the benefits which will accrue in the long term to the maintenance of 
international peace and security if the struggle against international terrorism 
is successful. 
2.3. The Position of the International Court of Justice 
2.3.1. The Corfu Channel Case 
Scholars who maintain that art. 2(4) has prescribed an absolute prohibition 
of the use of force refer to the judgment of the International Court of Justice 
in the Corfu Channel Case (1949). I will try to demonstrate that the correct 
interpretation to be given to that judgment is not as clear cut as the restrictionists 
maintain. 
In that judgment, the Court was asked to ascertain the legality of a 
forcible intrusion by British ships into the territorial waters of Albania. This 
minesweeping operation was undertaken after British ships had been struck 
by mines while crossing the Corfu Channel. The British government first 
argued that its intervention was made necessary in order to secure evidence to 
determine wheter the mines were actually laid by Albania91. In addition, the 
British government maintained that such an operation was justified as a 
measure of auto-protection or self-help. The oft-quoted answer of the Court : 
The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation 
of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and 
such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organization, 
find a place in international law. ... Between independent States, respect for 
territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations. The 
Court recognizes that the Albanian government's complete failure to carry out 
its duties after the explosions, and the dilatory nature of its diplomatic notes, are 
extenuating circumstances for the action of the United Kingdom Government. 
90. BROWNLIE, Use of Force by States, supra, note 1, p. 301. 
91. Corfu Channel Case, p. 34. 
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But to ensure respect for internatinoal law, of which it is the organ, the Court 
must declare that the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of 
Albanian sovereignty.92 
This dictum has been interpreted by may scholars as clear evidence that 
the Charter abolished the alleged right of forceful intervention, and that there 
cannot be any exception to the prohibition of the use of force other than those 
explicitly provided in the Charter. But the application of this judgment to the 
present situation is not as clear as some pretend. 
First, it is somewhat surprising that the Court did not make any 
reference at all, in its opinion, to the Charter9*. One could have expected at 
least a reference to art. 2(4), even if Albania was not a member of the United 
Nations. Judge Ecer, in its dissenting opinion, even criticised the majority 
judgment for not having mentioned any Charter provision94. 
Moreover, the general language used by the Court is also a source of 
ambiguity. 
It is not clear whether the "alleged right of intervention" refers to intervention 
generally or to intervention "in the particular form" adopted by the United 
Kingdom. , 5 
Indeed, the Court's qualification of the actions by the United Kingdom 
as "intervention" should be restricted to the particular facts in that case. The 
Court mentioned that the Albanian attitude was an extenuating factor in the 
case, thereby recognising that circumstances should be taken into account 
when assessing the legality of a use of force. Logically, this can only mean 
that, in certain situations, circumstances exclude the wrongfulness of an 
action qualified as "intervention". 
The judgment in the Corfu Channel Case should also be analysed in the 
light of its context. The intervention by the United Kingdom had, as its 
object, the collection of elements of proof (i.e. mines) and was not justified by 
any sense of urgency. The intervention to protect nationals has, as its prime 
objective, the rescue of human lives, and speed of action is essential if the 
operation is to be successful and lives safeguarded : 
le passage précité de la Cour de La Haye n'est qu'un obiter dictum inclus dans 
un arrêt dont le contexte seul peut préciser la portée ; et il est évident que les 
92. Id., p. 35. 
93. G. ScHWARZENBERGER./merrtad'ona/Law, vol. II, London, 1968, p. 55; BROWNLIE, Vseof 
Force by Stales, supra, note I, p. 289 ; D'ANGELO, "Resort to Force by States to Protect 
Nationals", supra, note 22, p. 502 ; MCDOUG AL and FELICI ANO, Law and Minimum World 
Order, supra, note 45, p. 276. 
94. Corfu Channel Case, p. 130. 
95. H. LAUTERPACHT (ed.), OPPENHEIMS, International Law, 8th ed., London, 1955, p. 311, 
note 2 ; see also BROWNLIE, Use of Force By States, supra, note 1, p. 289. 
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questions posées par l'affaire du détroit de Corfou se trouvent très loin du droit 
humanitaire.96 
Finally, one may point out that the Court was also asked to ascertain the 
legality of Britain's assertion of its right of innocent passage through the 
straits. After upholding the legality of Britain's affirmation of its right of 
innocent passage97, the Court analysed the manner, i.e. the use of four 
warships at action stations, with which this assertion of a legal right took 
place. 
The intention must have been, not only to test Albania's attitude but at the same 
time to demonstrate such force that she would abstain from firing again on 
passing ships. Having regard, however, to all the circumstances of the case... the 
Court is unable to characterise these measures taken by the United Kingdom 
authorities as a violation of Albania's sovereignty.98 
For Prof. Waldock, the Court thus not only recognized that force may be 
used in affirmation of legal rights unjustly denied, but also "to test the attitude 
of the wrongdoer and to coerce it into future good-behaviour... this seems to 
go close to allowing forcible self-help" " . It seems that the Court distinguished 
between a use of force for the purpose of countering or defensively preventing 
an attempt by force to deny a right and a use of force carried out in cases 
where the wrong has already been committed or a right denied 10°. 
It may be possible to argue that this "theory" of a forceful affirmation of 
a legal right unjustly denied must be limited to the particular facts of the 
case 101. Nevertheless, the decision of the Court regarding the use of force by 
the British ships in the assertion of its rights of innocent passage attenuates 
the interpretation given to the Corfu Channel Case by restrictionists : the 
Court has accepted that force can be legally used in situations other than 
those specifically mentioned in the Charter. Indeed, the Court's judgment 
leads one to conclude that art. 2(4) is not an absolute prohibition of the use of 
force in internatinal law and the legality of a use of force can be ascertained 
with regard to, inter alia, the purpose for which it is used. 
96. PEREZ-VERA, "La protection d'humanité", supra, note 49, p. 415; see also O'CONNELL, 
International Law, supra, note 39, p. 303. 
97. Corfu Channel Case, p. 30. 
98. rd.,p. 31. 
99. WALDOCK, "Regulation of the Use of Force in International Law", supra, note 1, p. 501. 
100. Id., p. 502; H. WALDOCK, "General Course on Public International Law", (1962-11) 106 
R.C.A.D.I. 1, p. 240; G. FITZMAURICE, "The General Principles of International Law", 
(1957-11) 92 R.C.A.D.I. 1, p. 172. 
101. M. SORENSEN, "Principes de droit international public", (I960-III) 101 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 
p. 240-1. 
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2.3.2. The Case Concerning United States Diplomatie 
and Consular Staff in Tehran 
The Court, in the Case concerning United States Diplomatie and 
Consular staff in Tehran (1980), did not rule on the legality of the right of 
intervention to protect nationals : it specifically pointed out that the question 
of the validity of the American rescue operation was not in issue and could 
"have no bearing on the evaluation of the conduct of the Iranian Government 
over six months earlier, on November 4, 1979"102. 
This failure of the Court to condemn the rescue mission is, nevertheless, 
significant. If art. 2(4) has laid down an absolute prohibition of the use of 
force, then there would be no need to qualify or attach importance to the 
purposes of a use of force, as it would always be illegal. Had the Court 
adopted such reasoning, it would have been easy, without entering into a 
factual detailed analysis, to categorize the action as an unlawful use of force, 
save for the right of self-defence as explicitly safeguarded by art. 51 of the 
Charter. Instead, the Court refused to adjudicate on the issue, even if it was 
perfectly aware of a State practice and a doctrine which assert the lawfulness 
of such actions. This demonstrates that the Court has not adopted, per se, the 
restrictionist view, that its judgment in the Corfu Channel Case did not 
adjudicate on the point, contrary to what the restrictionists maintain, and 
that the issue is still unsettled. 
Indeed, the use of the word "incursion"103, instead of "intervention" as 
used in the Corfu Channel Case or "invasion", suggests the idea of a use of 
force of lesser gravity, which reinforces the contention that art. 2(4) is a 
qualified prohibition of the use of force. 
[...] the use of a narrower term supports the claims made by the realists [...] that 
the use of force to protect nationals, if properly exercised, does not impair the 
territorial sovereignty and political independence of a nation.104 
This judgment therefore demonstrates the Court's unwillingness to 
condemn such rescue operations outright. In that respect, it represents a 
setback for the restrictionist view, whose absolutist and categorical interpretation 
of art. 2(4) would not even permit such leeway. The analysis of the recent 
judgment of the Court in the Nicaragua Case reinforces this conclusion. 
102. Tehran Case, p. 43-4, para. 94. 
103. Id., p. 43, para. 93. 
104. D'ANGEI o, "Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals", supra, note 22, p. 517. 
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2.3.3. The Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua 
On June 27 1986, the International Court of Justice delivered one of the 
most important judgments by an international tribunal in the post-Charter 
era. I will now demonstrate, in the foregoing analysis, that the Court has put 
to rest most of the major arguments raised by those who see in art. 2(4) an 
absolute prohibition of the use of force. 
The Court was called upon to assess the legality of the involvement of the 
United States in guerilla activities directed against the Nicaraguan government. 
Because of a reservation made by the United States regarding its acceptance 
of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, the Court could not 
directly refer to the Charter and had to rely specifically on international 
customary law. It therefore had to pronounce itself on the contents of 
customary internatinal law. 
As regards the suggestion that the areas covered by the two sources of law are 
identical, the Court observes that the United Nations Charter,..., by no means 
covers the whole area of the regulation of the use of force in international 
relations.,05 
The argument raised against the proposition that art. 2(4) is a qualified 
prohibition of force is that the Charter, through art. 2(4), has abolished the 
pre-existing customary law with regards to the use of force, and that no 
exception can be found, except in an explicit provision of the Charter. The 
Court, by specifying that the Charter does not cover "the whole area of the 
regulation of the use of force", rejected that view : there are other rules of 
international law, besides the Charter, which come into play when one 
assesses the legality of a use of force. Thus, rights to use armed coercion can 
be found in international customary law. 
The Court then considered the content of the principle of the non-use of 
force in international law. 
What is unlawful, in accordance with that principle, is recourse to either the 
threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state.I06 
This statement of the Court demonstrates that the words used in art. 2(4) 
are to be given a real meaning. The Court has defined the principle of the 
prohibition of the use of force by referring explicitly to the concepts of 
105. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, [1986] 
I.C.J. Rep. 3, p. 94, para. 176. 
106. Id., p. 118, para. 227. 
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territorial integrity and political independence : they can no longer be brushed 
away on the argument that the travaux préparatoires show they were not 
intended to qualify the prohibition of the use of force. A contrario, this 
statement shows that a use of armed force which does not violate the 
territorial integrity or political independence of a state is valid in international 
law. Hence the legitimacy of a use of force for the protection of nationals. 
The Court's ruling brings support to the "realist" position in another 
way. It accepted "as established the fact that certain transborder military 
incursions into the territory of Honduras and Costa Rica are imputable to the 
Government of Nicaragua"l07. Further on, however, the Court declared itself 
unable to adjudicate on the legality of these "transborder military incursions" : 
Very little information is however available to the Court as to the circumstances 
of these incursions or their possible motivations, which renders it difficult to 
decides whether they may be treated for legal purposes as amounting, singly or 
collectively, to an "armed attack" by Nicaragua on either or both States.I08 (My 
underlines) 
The Court thus considers that the purposes, the intentions, the "motiva-
tions" of the acting state are relevant considerations in assessing the legality of 
a use of force. This means that the qualified interpretation of art. 2(4), which 
recognizes as relevant the intentions of the acting state in ascertaining the 
legality of a use of force, is the appropriate one. 
The Court was also called upon to assess the legal consequences of the 
supply of arms and logistical support to armed forces within another state's 
territory. If such actions by one state cannot be interpreted as an "armed 
attack" against another state, the Court nevertheless concluded that these 
"activities may well constitute a breach of the principle of the non-use of 
force..."I09, which could justify "proportionate counter-measures on the part 
of the State which had been the victim of these acts..."110. Could these 
"counter-measures" include a limited use of force ? 
Even if the Court ultimately found it unnecessary to decide the issue with 
regard to the response by the victim state '" , a logical assumption flowing 
from its answer concerning collective "counter-measures" suggests they 
could. At paragraph 249, the Court explicitly stated that collective counter-
measures cannot be undertaken112. The Court then specified, in addition, 
that such counter-measures by third states could not involve a use of force. 
107. Id. p. 87, para. 164. 
108. Id. p. 120, para. 231. 
109. Id. p. 127, para. 247; see also p. 104, para. 195 
110. Id. p. 127, para. 248-9. 
HI. Id. p. 110, para. 210. 
112. Id. p. 127. 
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a use of force of a lesser degree of gravity [than an armed attack] cannot, ..., 
produce any entitlement to take collective counter-measures involving the use 
of force. The acts.. . could only have justified proportionate counter-measures 
on the part of the State which had been the victim of these acts. ... They could 
not justify counter-measures taken by a third State, and particularly could not 
justify intervention involving the use of force. m 
If the use of force otherwise than in self-defence is now illegal under 
international law, why then did the Court explicitly add that counter-
measures undertaken by a third state could not include a use of force ? Putting 
it the other way around, after having denied that a third state could take 
counter-measures, this latter precision by the Court is unnecessary and 
irrelevant, unless one concludes that individual counter-measures involving a 
use of force could be legal. Prof. Hargrove comes to the same conclusion : 
The Court strongly suggested [...] that the victim state's "proportionate counter-
measures" might themselves include the use of force. ' l 4 
Indeed, the concept of "proportionate counter-measures" could very 
well be developed to include the right of intervention for the protection of 
nationals"5. Such is not, however, the objective of this analysis and my 
conclusions will be limited to those previously developed. 
2.4. State Practice 
We have reviewed extensively both sides of the question of the relationship 
between art. 2(4) and the right of intervention to protect nationals. We have 
analysed the doctrine, thejurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, 
and the rules of treaty interpretation. Arguments have been raised to support 
a qualified view of art. 2(4). But, in the final analysis, "the acid test of such 
arguments is, ..., state practice""6. It is thus necessary, at this point, to put 
aside the writings of the commentators and to reaffirm that international law 
is, in essence, the reflection of state practice. And state practice since 1945 
demonstrates that the right of intervention to protect nationals is alive and 
well. 
It will not, however, be our task to review the actual instances when 
states have either contemplated or actually used force for the declared 
purpose of rescuing their nationals. Other scholars have done so, in such an 
113. Id., p. 127, para. 249. 
114. J.L. HARGROVE, "The Nicaragua judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-
Defense", (1987) 81 A.J.I.L. 135, p. 138; see also T.J. FARER, "Drawing the Right Line", 
(1987)81 A.J.I.L. 112, p. 113. 
115. HARGROVE, "The Nicaragua Judgment", supra, note 114, p. 143. 
116. DAVIDSON, Grenada, supra, note 49, p. 121. 
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elaborate fashion that any study on our part of this question would turn out 
to be a very pale analysis in comparison. I will limit myself to a few specific 
considerations. 
The analysis has been divided into two broad categories. Later on, we 
will study the lessons to be drawn from the actual instances where force was 
used on that justification. But first, I would like to review the work of the 
United Nations, work which can be seen, in so far as it is evidence of the 
opinion of the community of states, as a form of state practice. In that respect, 
we will concentrate on certain resolutions of the United Nations General 
Assembly which have often been quoted by some to support the view that art. 
2(4) is an absolute prohibition of the use of force. 
2.4.1. The Work of the United Nations 
The principle embodied in art. 2(4) has been the subject of more 
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly than any other principle 
contained in the Charter. Because of the great number of resolutions, it would 
be tiresome to review and analyse them all. Only those which are most often 
quoted by the restrictionists to support their position will be analysed. 
What is striking about those resolutions which have restated the principle 
of the non-use of force in international relations is that they have never 
rephrased it. Restrictionists contend that the words "territorial integrity", 
"political independence", "or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of 
the United Nations" are not to be given any qualifying meaning. According to 
that interpretation, art. 2(4) could very well be read without mentioning those 
last 23 words. If that was the correct interpretation to be given to art. 2(4), 
why then has the General Assembly constantly defined the prohibition of use 
of force as force directed against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of a state? What is usually condemned by the institutions of the United 
Nations is not resort to force per se, but more the violation of the territorial 
integrity and/ or political independence of a particular state. This demonstrates 
a willingness to attribute to these words a meaning, a purpose, which is in 
sharp contrast with the restrictionist attitude. 
It is also striking to note the very broad terms used in these resolutions to 
define the principle of the use of force. Only one resolution, Res. 2625-XXS 
(1970), tries to define in more precise terms the content of art. 2(4). In that 
respect, the fact that there is no mention, at any point, even implicitly, of the 
right of protection of nationals, is very surprising : states had asserted it on 
many occasions in the years preceding the adoption of the resolution and it 
was an item already hotly debated among scholars. 
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this total silence on the protection of nationals abroad stands in marked 
contrast to the express denunciation of reprisals involving the use of force . l n 
It is not my intention to interpret this silence of Res. 2625-XXV (1970) 
on the protection of nationals as clear evidence that the use of force for such a 
purpose does not contravene art. 2(4). A variety of different circumstances 
may explan this omission. This shows, however, that Res. 2625-XXV (1970) 
cannot be interpreted as evidence that the community of states regard the 
right of intervention for the protection of nationals as illegal. 
The other resolution often alluded to by restrictionists to demonstrate 
that the right of protection over nationals is prohibited by art. 2(4) is Res. 
3314-XXIX (1914), otherwise known as the Definition of Aggression. Again 
restrictionists invoke broad, general statements in this resolution to support 
their view of art. 2(4). They point out in particular to art. 5 of the resolution 
which states that "no consideration of whatever nature, whether political, 
economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression" : 
for the restrictionists, this demonstrates that the intention of the acting state is 
irrelevant in appreciating if a use of force is aggression or not. 
This qualification of the exercise of the right of intervention to protect 
nationals as an aggression does not withstand close analysis. 
First, the comments made concerning the generality of res. 2625-XXV 
(1970), and its abstention from an implicit or explicit reference to the right of 
protection of nationals are equally applicable to Res. 3314-XXIX (1974). In 
fact, they are even more powerful in this case. The quest for a definition of 
aggression has been a concern for both the league of Nations and the United 
Nations and dates back to the 1920's. In that respect, it is interesting to recall 
the definition submitted by the Soviet Union to the 1933 disarmament 
conference in Geneva. After enumerating certain acts which constituted 
aggression, the definition specified : 
2. No considerations whatsoever of a political, strategical, or economic nature, 
..., shall be accepted as justification of aggression as defined... In particular, 
justification for attack cannot be based upon ... possible danger to life or 
property of foreign residents. " 8 
This definition was submitted to a committee under the chairmanship of 
Mr. Nicolas Politis. This committee studies the Soviet proposal and adopted 
a different definition, which became known as the Politis definition : and it is 
interesting to note that the specific mention of the danger to foreign citizens as 
117. BOWETT, "Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals", in Cassese, supra, note 11, p. 40. 
118. As quoted in S.M. SCHWEBEL, "Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defense", (1972-11) 136 
R.C.A.D.I. 411, p. 440-1. 
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a non-justifiable use of force was dropped. The Politis definition kept only a 
broad statement similar to art. 5 of Res. 3314-XXIX{\ 91 A) ' l9. In its proposal 
to the United Nations in January 1952, the Soviet Union again included in its 
definition a clause specifying that "may not be used as justification for attack 
... any danger which may threaten the life ... of aliens"l20. And again it was 
dropped. 
Leaving the protection of nationals out of the final draft may be due to a 
variety of reasons. However, the fact that an explicit mention of the right was 
twice considered but later dropped certainly shows that the question is not 
settled : restrictionists cannot maintain that the right of intervention to 
protect nationals is aggression according to the Res. 3314-XXIX (1974). 
Second, art. 5 of the resolution is too broad, too general and irrelevant to 
the present issue. Nobody denies that an aggression cannot be justified on 
economic or political considerations : the real issue is to determine which acts 
constitute aggression. 
Moreover, all the acts defined as aggression in the resolution are subject 
to an attenuating clause : 
Article 2 
[...] the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a 
determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be 
justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the 
acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity. 
This criterion of gravity can certainly apply to the right of intervention to 
protect nationals121. But, more importantly, this consideration of "other 
relevant circumstances" brings into the appreciation of a use of force the 
question of the aggressive intention 122. 
The relevance of the intention of the acting state has been a much 
debated item for the past five decades. Essential in the eyes of Western 
countries, the question of aggressive intention had been the stumbling block 
for all the attempts to adopt a definition of aggression. Can the absence of any 
specific mention of the question of intention in Res. 3314-XXIX (1974) be 
interpreted as a rejection of intention as a relevant consideration ? The answer 
must be "no". 
119. As quoted in GIRAUD, "L'interdiction du recours à la force", supra, note 57, p. 508-9. 
120. Question of Defining Aggression : USSR Draft Resolution, U.N.G.A.O.R., 6th session, 
Annexes, A/C.6/L.208. 
121. GREEN, "Humanitarian Intervention", supra, note41, p. 219-220 ; JEFFERY, "The American 
Hostages in Tehran", supra, note 41, p. 727. 
122. J. ZOUREK, "Enfin une définition de l'agression", (1974) 20 A.F.D.I. 9, p. 26. 
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Both sides maintained that their respective and diametrically opposed positions 
represented the correct (and the only correct), meaning of the slightly amended 
Article 2 of the Consensus Definition. So that on this point the definition 
remains subject, after the consensus, to the same conflicting state positions 
which had been officially reported shortly before as barring consensus ; namely, 
whether the prima facie stigmatized external acts would cease to be so because 
of the non-aggressive intention or purpose with which they were committed.123 
I have emphasized this continuing debate over the question of aggressive 
intention to demonstrate that its relevance in deciding whether an act 
contravenes art. 2(4) has not been rejected outright by international law. 
Indeed, states which have been opposed to it have found it desirable to 
introduce into the definition of aggression some leeway which enables 
intention to be considered as an important element in the appreciation of the 
legitimacy of a use of force. 
2.4.2. Instances of Actual Intervention by States 
There are numerous instances in which force was threatened to be 
employed, or employed in fact by states with the declared objective of 
rescuing their nationals. Prof. Bowett124 and Prof. Ronzitti125 have drawn up 
an impressive list : the Arab States' and Israel's justification of their resort to 
force in 1948, the Unitd Kingdom's threatened intervention in Iran in 1946 
and 1951, and in Egypt in 1952, the British and French joint intervention at 
Suez in 1956, the 1960 Belgian intervention in the Congo, the United States 
intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, the "Mayaguez" incident 
between the United States and Cambodia in 1975, the Israel intervention at 
Entebbe Airport, in Uganda, in 1976, the 1978 Egyptian raid on Larnaca 
Airport, in Cyprus, the American rescue attempt in Iran in April 1980, and 
the American intervention in Grenada in 1983. 
If states have often invoked the right of intervention to protect nationals, 
the basis on which they have done so has not always been the same. Some 
states see it as part of the right of self-defence, others, as a self-standing right. 
A particular state may declare at one time that intervention is part of the right 
of self-defence, but on another occasion be at pains to demonstrate that it is a 
self-standing right. For example, the United States argued in 1980 that its 
rescue mission in Iran was undertaken pursuant to art. 51 of the Charter126. 
123. J. STONE, "Hopes and Loopholes in the Definition of Aggression", (1977) 71 A.J.I.L. 224, 
p. 229. 
124. BOWETT, "Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad", in Cassese, supra, note 31, 
p. 41-4; RONZITTI, Rescuing Nationals Abroad, supra, note 1, p. 26-52. 
125. RONZITTI, supra, note 1, p. 26-49. 
126. JEFFERY, "The American Hostages in Tehran", supra, note 41, p. 723. 
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In 1983, the United States justified their actions in Grenada in part on the 
right of intervention to protect nationals but its legal basis for doing so was 
totally different. 
Protection of nationals is a well-established, narrowly drawn ground for the use 
of force which has not been considered to conflict with the U.N. Charter.... We 
did not content that the action on Grenada was an exercise of the inherent right 
of self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.... We relied instead 
on the narrower, well-established ground of protection of U.S. nationals. I27 
Does this ambivalence affect the probative value of the state practice ? I 
believe not : it goes to show that there is some disagreement on the conceptual 
basis of the right, but not on its existence. I believe personally that the self-
defence theory is to be discarded, as will be shown later on. 
It has often been pointed out that this list of actual cases of intervention 
for the protection of nationals demonstrates that only Western countries have 
resorted to it to justify a use of force. Invariably, the victim states have been 
third world states which were not powerful enough to resist the intervention, 
and which have denounced the action. Indeed, the debates in the Security 
Council show that, generally, the majority of the third world states and the 
Soviet bloc deny the legitimacy of the use of force for that purpose. Therefore, 
it is alleged that the state practice is not generalized and universal enough to 
bring the right of intervention to protect nationals into the body of internatinal 
customary law. I disagree with this conclusion, for the following reasons. 
First of all, it is very interesting to note that, more often than not, states 
reject the legitimacy of a state's intervention, not by denying the existence of 
the right, but by denying the existence of the factual circumstances giving rise 
to the right. After a thorough analysis of state practice after 1945, Prof. 
Ronzitti observed that... 
As a matter of fact, those States which consider intervention as unlawful have 
often preferred to question whether the nationals of the intervening State had 
actually been mistreated, without taking a stance over the existence of the right 
to intervene to protect nationals.128 
The denial of the application of a rule to a particular situation, by 
alluding only to the factual circumstances on which recourse to the rule is 
127. U.S. Department of State, "Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States: Grenada 1983" in 
M.N. LEICH, "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law", 
(\9M)1?, A.J.I.L. 655, p. 664-5. 
128. RONZITTI, Rescuing Nationals Abroad, supra, note 1, p. 53; see also KNISBACHER, "The 
Entebbe Operation", supra, note 1, p. 78, where the author, after reviewing the Security 
Council debates following the I960 Belgian intervention, the 1965 American intervention, 
and the 1976 Israeli raid on Entebbe, arrives at the same conclusion. 
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conditioned, implies logically an acceptance of the existence of the rule. Or it 
is at least "a demonstration of the lack of conviction on the part of these 
States as to the illegality of action aimed at rescuing human lives"129. As a 
matter of fact, that lack of conviction may be due to the fact that those states 
do not want to reject now the existence of a right of which they might be 
forced to avail themselves in the future, if faced with a similar situation. 
It is also too radical to assert that only the big Western powers have 
recognized the existence of the right. During the 1960 debates in the Security 
Council on the Belgian intervention in Congo, several Latin American 
countries, whose opinion is highly relevant because they have themselves 
often been subjected in the past two centuries to such interventions by the 
United States, did not condemn the Belgian rescue operation l3°. For instance, 
the Argentine government, during the Security Council debates on July 21st, 
1960, clearly stated its support of the Belgian government. 
Now, we are convinced that the protection of the life and honour of individuals 
is a sacred duty to which all other considerations must yield. We cannot 
reproach the Belgian government for having assumed this duty when Belgian 
nationals were in danger. Any other state would have done the same. I31 
In 1965, Taiwan and the Netherlands acknowledged as legitimate the 
landing of troops by the United States in the Dominican Republic l32. In 1980, 
the U.S. attempted rescue operation was "fully endorsed ... by the E.E.C. 
countries, Canada, Australia, Japan, Israel and Egypt" m . The case of Egypt 
is particularly interesting. Before 1978, Egypt had been traditionally opposed 
to any intervention on its soil for the purpose of protecting foreigners. 
However Egypt's attitude changed radically in 1978, after Egyptian citizens 
had been killed or taken hostages in Cyprus. The Egyptian military aircraft 
received permission from the Cypriot government to land on Larnaca 
Airport; the Cypriot government had, however, forbidden any military 
action. The Egyptians nevertheless intervened militarily and, if they did not 
specifically invoked the right of intervention to protect nationals, they 
nevertheless believed their action was lawful. And, indeed, in 1980, after the 
aborted American rescue operation in Iran, Egypt offered its help for an 
eventual second rescue mission by the United States l34. 
129. RONZITTI, Rescuing Nationals Abroad, supra, note 1, p. 67. 
130. Id., p. 56. 
131. U.N.S.C.O.R., 15th year, S/PV. 878, 878th meeting, p. 24, para. 118. 
132. RONZITTI, Rescuing Nationals Abroad, supra, note 1, p. 56. 
133. Id., p. 57. 
134. Id., p. 47. 
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The Egyptian example brings us to another, more fundamental consider-
ation, i.e. the extent to which state practice must be generalized and universal 
enough to support the view that the right of protection over nationals is part 
of international law. I do not wish to enter into an in-depth analysis of the 
proof of a customary rule of international law : extensive treatises have been 
written on the subject, and it would be beyond the scope of this essay. But I 
would emphasise a few considerations. 
First, I am not trying to prove the establishment of a customary rule of 
law: such a rule was recognized in pre-1945 days. I am only trying to 
demonstrate, through an extensive and repeated state practice, that this rule 
has not been extinguished by the enactment of the Charter. The burden of 
proof and the consistency of state practice needed to support the former is 
much heavier than the latter. 
One must also remember that, when considering the extent of state 
practice related to a particular rule, greater weight must be given to the 
opinion of interested states l35. In the case of the right of intervention to 
protect nationals, the interested states are mostly Western powers because of 
the context in which these interventions take place and the nature of the 
intervening states themselves. A rescue operation becomes necessary when 
foreigners are faced with extreme danger, when the territorial state is either 
unwilling or unable to protect them. It therefore implies a breakdown of law 
and order which usually happens only either in third world states insufficienly 
developed to exercise proper control over their territory, or in states unwilling 
to do so because they are sponsoring terrorism and international blackmail. 
In both cases, the target of these actions are usually citizens of the Western 
countries, because of the antagonism which exists towards these states. To 
put it bluntly, it is not Canada or Mexico against which hatred is directed and 
which is blamed for the problems of the world, it is the United States, France, 
the United Kingdom, ... . 
In addition, these states are the ones invoking the right of intervention to 
protect nationals because of the nature of their internal society. These states 
have been the pioneers of the protection and promotion of human rights both 
on the international and on the municipal level. They are more responsive to 
threats directed against their own citizens, because ofthat general concern for 
human rights and because they are infinitely more sensitive to their internal 
public opinion : opinion which is bound to pressure their government into 
action, since it is morally, politically — if not legally — right to do so. 
Since the Western states are more likely to be faced with such imperative 
situations, their opinion is to be given more weight in analysing the existence 
135. SHAW, International Law, supra, note 66, p. 66. 
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of the rule. In that respect, the Egyptian example is highly relevant. We have 
seen that the Egyptian government changed its attitude towards the existence 
of the right, and it did so because it was faced with a situation which made the 
intervention compelling : its own citizens were now victims of internatinal 
terrorism. One should therefore not weight as heavily the opinion of states 
which have never been faced with situations of this kind ; the opinion of the 
states which did is to be given a greater regard. 
To conclude, it is believed that state practice since 1945, when analysed 
in the light of the considerations mentioned, can only point out to the 
existence of a right of intervention to protect nationals. And this conclusion 
becomes all the more imperative when state practice is analysed in a global 
context, together with the legal arguments developed previously. I do admit, 
however, that an intervention to protect nationals could be seen as a use of 
force prima facie prohibited by international law. In that case, I believe that it 
could be justified, provided the appropriate factual circumstances are proven, 
not as an exercise of the right of self-defence, but because of the existence of a 
"state of necessity". 
3. Intervention for the Protection of Nationals as a legitimate Exception 
to the Prohibition of the Use of Force 
If one school of thought has adopted the concept of a self-standing right, 
there is a considerable number of scholars who prefer to see in the right of 
intervention to protect nationals a use of force that is prima facie prohibited 
by international law. Such use of force would be illegal unless it falls within a 
recognized exception to the general prohibition of the use of force. 
Two such exceptions can be identified : the right of self-defence under 
art. 51 of the Charter, and the state of necessity as definied by art. 33 of the 
draft articles on state responsibility drawn up the International Law Commis-
sion. The former has been extensively discussed, and it is not my intention to 
restate the arguments raised on both sides. I would rather demonstrate that 
the right of self-defence is not conceptually applicable to the factual situations 
in which a rescue operation usually takes place. 
I will thereafter concentrate my energies on the analysis of a concept that 
has not been developed by the doctrine in the context of the right of 
intervention to protect nationals : necessity. Provided the right factual cir-
cumstances are present, a rescue operation can be found legitimate by reason 
of the existence of a state of necessity. 
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3.1. Self-Defence and Intervention to Protect Nationals 
The right of self-defence has been part of the general body of international 
law since the beginning of the XIXth Century. Up until 1945, the right of self-
defence had a broad connotation, and armed force could be used for such 
purpose to repel not only direct armed invasion against the territory of a state 
but also attacks against what a state considered to be its vital interests. The 
protection of nationals was generally considered to fall within the purview of 
these "vital" interests. 
After the enactment of the Charter, the circumstances in which the right 
of self-defence could be used, and the definition of the interests to be upheld 
through its exercise, became the subject of another doctrinal controversy, one 
which surrounds art. 51. Proponents and adversaries of the legality of 
intervention to protect nationals argue over the correct interpretation of this 
provision. Two questions are at the heart of the debate : whether the existence 
of an armed attack is a necessary pre-condition to the exercise of the right of 
self-defence ; and, if so, whether an attack against nationals can be equated 
with an armed attack in the sense of article 51. 
One could certainly maintain that the recent judgment of the International 
Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua (1986), has put an end to part of the debate. If the 
Court recognized that art. 51 of the Charter was referring to international 
customary law, it nevertheless pointed out that the present content of article 
51 "has been confirmed and influenced by the Charter"l36. This "influence" of 
the Charter is clearly stated by the Court : the exercise of the right of 
individual self-defence "is subject to the State concerned having been the 
victim of an armed attack"l37. Later on, while talking of the right of collective 
self-defence, the Court characterized the existence of an armed attack upon 
the victim State as a condition sine qua non l38 for its lawful exercise. 
If one can no longer deny that an armed attack is necessary for the 
exercise of the right of self-defence, the debate is not entirely closed as it is 
bound to shift to a definitional approach. The question now is the determination 
of the meaning of armed attack in the context of article 51. Can an attack 
upon nationals abroad be said to be an armed attack against a state? 
One could say that, in certain circumstances, it would be plausible to 
maintain that an attack against nationals is an attack against the state. This 
136. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, [1986] 
l.C.J. Rep. 3, p. 94, para. 176. 
137. Id., p. 103, para. 195. 
138. Id., p. 122, para. 227. 
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could be the case, for example, when nationals are directly attacked by a state 
because of political antagonism toward their particular government. The 
overall difficulty lies, nevertheless, in the determination of the threshold 
needed to transform an attack against individuals into an armed attack 
against a state. Moreover, an armed intervention can become necessary in 
situations other than this one : self-defence thus represents an unsatisfactory 
solution to the problem of how to justify such rescue operations. 
This inability of self-defence to justify the use of armed force in situations 
when rescue operations must be undertaken is due, in addition, to the 
existence of a conceptual problem linked with the essence of the right of self-
defence. Even if we accept a broader view of the right of self-defence, its 
exercise implies a previous internatinal delict, i.e. "la violation d'un droit"139 : 
there must be a breach of a legal duty owed to the state acting in self-defence. 
In the era of international terrorism and of indirect and covert aggressions, 
antagonistic acts directed towards the nationals of a particular state are 
usually not undertaken by state officials, but are more likely to be acts of 
private individuals. To attribute their actions to a state entity, a very high 
degree of control by the state over these individuals has to be shown. 
Imputability is established only if the individuals have acted in the name of 
and on behalf of the state authorities, if "in fact, on the occasion in question 
the militants acted on behalf of the State, having been charged by some 
competent organ of the [...] State to carry out a specific operation"140. 
The Court has taken the view ... that United States participation, even if 
preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organizing, training, supplying and 
equipping of the contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and 
the planning of the whole of its operation, is still insufficient in itself [...] for the 
purpose of attributing to the United States the acts committed by the contras in 
the course of their military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. "" 
Indeed, the assistance given by the state to the individuals has to be of 
such a magnitude as to amount to an outright and direct attack by one state 
against another. Such is the lesson to be drawn from the Court's judgment in 
the Nicaragua Casel42. 
139. NGUYEN, Q.D., "La légitime défense d'après la Charte des Nations-Unies", (1948) 52 
R.G.D.l.P. 223, p. 242. 
140. Case concerning United States Diplomatie and Consular Staff in Tehran[l9%0]I.CJ. Rep. 
3, p. 29, para. 58. 
141. Nicaragua case, supra, note 136, p. 64, para. 115. 
142. Id., p. 104, para. 195; p. 119, para. 230; p. 122, para. 237; see also T.J. FARER, "Drawing 
the Right Line", (1987) 81 A.J.I.L. 112, p. 113. 
480 Les Cahiers de Droit (1989) 30 C. de D. 441 
Therefore, it can sometimes happen that the state on whose territory 
foreign nationals are facing an extreme danger has not committed any 
internatinal delict: the offensive acts are not attributable to it and it has 
respected its obligation of due diligence in the protection of the life and liberty 
of aliens. In those situations, the right of self-defence cannot be invoked 
because of the absence of its very essence : the prior existence of a delict. 
Time has come to relieve an otherwise overburdened theory of self-
defence and to rely on another concept. A concept which is better suited to 
respond to the different situations in which an intervention to protect 
nationals becomes necessary ; a concept which will be adaptable to the ever-
changing international society : a concept which will take into account what 
Prof. Bowett called "the principle of the relativity of rights", according to 
which one state's right to territorial sovereignty must be weighed against the 
other state's right to protection of its nationals143: that is, the concept of 
"necessity". 
3.2. Necessity and Intervention to Protect Nationals 
3.2.1. Necessity as a Circumstance Precluding Wrongfulness 
In its 1980 report dealing with its work on state responsibility, the 
Internatinoal Law Commission adopted a comprehensive definition of what 
constitutes a state of necessity : 
The term "state of necessity" is used by the Commission to denote the situation 
of a State whose sole means of safeguarding an essential interest threatened by a 
grave and imminent peril is to adopt conduct not in conformity with what is 
required of it by an international obligation to another state.144 
The state of necessity is, in essence, an excuse precluding wrongfulness of 
an otherwise illegal act ; it provides a justification for "the non-observance of 
international obligations ... if the excuse is valid, it excludes international 
responsibility"l45. 
Necessity is not to be confused with the concepts of force majeure or cas 
fortuit. These concepts imply an irresistible force, an unforeseen external 
circumstance outside the control of the state, making it materially impossible 
143. D. BOWETT, Self-defence in International Law, Manchester, 1958, p. 93. 
144. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its 32nd session, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1980, vol. II, part. 2, A/35/10, p. 34, 
para. I. 
145. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, "Fundamental Principles of International Law", (1955-1) 87 
R.C.A.D.I. 191, p. 343. 
J. RABY Ressortissants 481 
for a state to act in conformity with international law. On the contrary, the 
state of necessity "implique un comportement librement et volontairement 
adopté" l46, a voluntary choice, even if more theoretical than practical, made 
by the acting state whereby the upholding of essential interests is found to be 
preferable to the respect of another state's rightsl47. 
Thus, necessity calls for "une comparaison des valeurs respectives des 
intérêts en présence"l48 
[necessity] is a factual situation in which a state asserts the existence of an 
interest of such vital importance to it that the obligation it may have to respect a 
specific subjective right of another state must yield because respecting it would, 
in view of that circumstance, be incompatible with safeguarding the interest in 
question. I4 ' 
One should also make a clear distinction between the state of necessity 
and self-defence. First, the state of necessity is not a right but a factual 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness : indeed, the absence, prima facie, of 
any right to act in a certain fashion by the state invoking necessity is the raison 
d'être of the concept of necessity. 
Second, but most importantly, necessity differs from self-defence in that 
the essence of the latter concept implies a breach of a legal duty owed to the 
State acting in self-defence. On the other hand, the state invoking necessity 
may violate rights of an innocent state which has not committed any 
internationally wrongful act. 
La notion se distingue de la légitime défense en ce qu'elle ne présuppose pas un 
acte illicite de la part d'un autre État, et la mesure prise ne se dirige pas 
nécessairement contre quelqu'un qui a provoqué le péril. I5° 
Unlike self-defence, writers have not discussed to any great extent 
necessity as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness of an intervention 
undertaken for the purpose of rescuing nationals. This is all the more 
surprising since the concept of necessity has been repeatedly reviewed by 
numerous scholars. Classical writers such as Grotius, Wolff and Vattel had 
146. J. SALMON, "Faut-il codifier l'état de nécessité en droit international", in J. MAKARCZYK 
(ed.), Essays in International Law In Honor of Judge Manfred Lachs, The Hague, 1984, 
235, p. 236. 
147. G.M. BADR, "The Exculpatory Effect of Self-defense in State Responsibility", (1980) 10 
Georgia J.I. Comp.L. 1, p. 9. 
148. C. DE VISSCHER, Théories et réalités en droit international, 3rd ed., Paris, 1960, p. 339. 
149. Report of Prof. Ago, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1980, vol. II,part 1, 
A/CN.4/3I8, ADD. 5-7, p. 18, para. 10. 
150. M. SORENSEN, "Principes de droit international public", (1960-III) 101 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 
p. 219-20. 
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explicitly accepted the concept of necessity as justifying conduct contrary to 
international obligations l51. 
In the XIXth century and XXth century, states frequently invoked 
"necessity", to justify either repudiations of financial obligations or violations 
of territorial obligations152. It is true that in most of the cases in which 
necessity was invoked, states raised numerous objections to it. However, 
according to Prof. Ago, these objections were usually limited to a denial of 
the existence of a state of necessity in the particular case, thereby admitting 
implicitly the validity of the principle per sel53. Sir Francis Vallat, a member 
of the Internatinal Law Commission, came to the same conclusion and noted 
"that in many cases the parties had agreed in recognizing the validity of the 
principle of state of necessity, irrespective of whether they accepted or 
rejected its application to the particular dispute between them"154. 
Moreover, it was explicitly mentioned in a few international judgments155, 
the most notable of which is the Oscar Chin Case (1934). If the Permanent 
Court of Justice abstained in its judgment from taking a specific position on 
it, the question was, however, considered in the indivdiual opinion of Judge 
Anzilotti : 
The situation would have been entirely different if the Belgian government had 
been acting under the law of necessity, since necessity may excuse the non-
observance of international obligations.I56 
For Prof. Zourek, this recognition of the concept of necessity by 
international tribunals is the best evidence of its place in international law. 
Comme la notion de nécessité a été admise par des tribunaux internationaux ... 
il ne semble plus possible de lui dénier une place dans le système de droit 
international. I57 
151. For an extensive review, see Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, p. 47, 
para. 29 and Report of Prof. Ago, p. 46, para. 71. 
152. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, pp. 35-45, para. 6-25 ; Report of Prof. 
Ago, p. 22-37, para. 21-55 ; C. ROUSSEAU, Droit international public, vol. V, Paris, 1983, 
p. 92-5 ; SALMON, "État de nécessité", supra, note 146, p. 240-2, p. 248-50. 
153. R. AGO, "Le délit international", (1939-11) 68 R.C.A.D.l. 419, p. 544; see also Report of 
Prof. Ago, p. 39, para. 57; P. GUGGENHFIM, Traité de droit international public, vol. II, 
Genève, 1954, p. 62; ANZILOTTI, Cours de droit international, vol. I, Paris, 1929, p. 510. 
154. Summary records of the meetings of the 32nd session, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1980, vol. I, 1618th meeting, p. 180, para. 21. 
155. ROUSSEAU, Droit international public, t. V, supra, note 65, p. 92-4. 
156. Oscar Chinn Case, P.C.[J. Series A/B, No. 63, 65, p. 113. 
157. J. ZOUREK, "La notion de légitime défense en droit international", (1975) 56 A.I.D.I. 1, 
p. 66. 
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But, along with an increased recourse by states to necessity to justify 
their actions, a doctrinal controversy developed as to whether the concept has 
any place in international law. But this denial of necessity as a valid concept in 
international law is unfounded, for the following reasons. 
First, the mere fact that the Internatinal Law Commission, after reviewing 
extensively the arguments raised by the publicists, decided to include necessity 
as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in its draft articles on state 
responsibility should convince even its most vehement opponents that the 
concept is indeed recognized in international law. As a matter of fact, the 
universality, either in terms of geographical repartition or in terms of legal 
traditions, of the members of the International Law Commission and the high 
reputation which follows each and every member of the Commission individ-
ually, ensure that its conclusions are the reflection of the general status of 
international customary law. 
Second, the arguments raised by the opponents of the concept appear to 
be irrelevant when one considers the state of necessity as defined by the 
Commission. After noting that a considerable number of publicists have 
taken a position either for or against the existence of a state of necessity in 
international law, the Commission resumed the position of XXth century 
scholars opposed to the notion : 
[they] are opposed to recognizing the ground of necessity as a principle of 
general international law because States use and abuse that so-called principle 
for inadmissible and often unacknowledgeable purposes, but [they] are ultimately 
prepared to grant it a limited function in certain specific areas of international 
law less sensitive than those in which the deplored abuses usually occur.I58 
This fear of its abuse by states which leads scholars to rebut the 
legitimacy of the state of necessity was due to the absence of specific and 
restrictive conditions surrounding the actual finding of a state of necessity. '59 
It was with this concern in mind that the International Law Commission 
presented and finally adopted an exhaustive definition of the state of necessity. 
Indeed, some members of the Commission who had been reclutant to 
approve the concept of necessity because of the very possibility of abuse 
changed their minds and recognized its place in international law. And they 
did so precisely because necessity is now, under the draft article of the 
Commission, very well circumscribed and its conditions of application are 
restrictively defined l60. 
158. Report of the Commission, p. 48, par. 30. 
159. SORENSEN, "Principes de droit international public", supra, note 150, p. 220. 
160. J. SALMON, "État de nécessité", supra, note 146, p. 244. 
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3.2.2. Conditions for the Existence of a State of Necessity 
A considerable number of publicists and scholars have defined the 
conditions required for the existence of a state of necessity. Whatever the 
individual merits of each and every opinion, I prefer to rely instead on the 
definition adopted in 1980 by the International Law Commission. 
Article 33. State of necessity 
1. A state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding 
the wrongfulness of an act of that State not in conformity with an international 
obligation of the State unless : 
(a) the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the State 
against a grave and imminent peril ; and 
(b) the act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards 
which the obligatioon existed. 
2. In any case, a state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for 
precluding wrongfulness : 
(a) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in 
conformity arises out of a peremptory norm of general international law ; or 
(b) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in 
conformity is laid down by a treaty which, explicitely or implicitly, excludes the 
possibility of invoking the state of necessity with respect to that obligation ; or 
(c) if the State in question has contributed to the occurrence of the state of 
necessity. 
Each of these constituent elements will be reviewed, after which they will 
be applied to the case of an intervention to protect nationals. 
3.2.2.1. Lack of other Means 
The state invoking necessity must have found itself in a situation which 
left no other effective means of action 161. For the Commission, 
... the adoption by that State of conduct not in conformity with an international 
obligation binding it to another State must definitely have been the only means 
of warding off the extremely grave and imminent peril which it apprehended ; in 
other words, the peril must not have been escapable by any other means, even a 
more costly one.162 
The means chosen must not only be the only one available but it must 
also be strictly limited to what is necessary to safeguard the interestl63. 
161. SALMON, "État de nécessité", supra, note 146, p. 245. 
162. Report of the Commission, p. 48, par. 33. 
163. Report of Prof. Ago, p. 20, para. 14; Report of the Commission, p. 48, par. 33. 
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3.2.2.2. The Quality of the Interest to be Safeguarded 
The quality of the interest to be safeguarded was the subject of greater 
disagreement among scholars. Most of the definitions presented in the 
doctrine seem to link the interest to be protected with the existence, the 
survival per se of the acting state 'M. Prof. Ago, in his report to the Commission, 
declined to adopt that view, because it is too restrictivel65 and reminiscent of 
the confusion between the concept of necessity and the concept of self-
preservation 166. The Commission agreed with Prof. Ago and decided to reject 
the concept of "vital interests" or "interest in the existence of the state itself, 
but its main reason for doing so was expressed differently. 
[The Commission] has made it quite clear in its review of practice that the cases 
in which a state of necessity has been invoked in order to safeguard an interest of 
the state other than the preservation of its very existence ultimately proved more 
frequent and less controversial than the cases in which a State has sought to 
justify itself on the ground of a danger to its actual existence. ,67 
The Commission, while adopting the term "essential interest", declined 
to spell out precisely what an essential interest is and to lay down specific 
categories. It will all depend "on all the circumstances in which the State is 
placed in different specific situations"168. This approach allows for the 
flexibility and the adaptability which are so much needed in a constantly 
evolving international scene. Far from being static, the concept of necessity is 
allowed to evolve with the international community and will thus be able to 
respond to new and varied situations. 
3.2.2.3. The Nature of the Right Infringed 
The relationship between the interest to be upheld and the international 
obligation which is infringed is the quintessential problem of the appreciation 
of the validity of necessity as an excuse in a particular case. Traditionally, that 
relationship had been expressed in hierarchical terms: the interest to be 
safeguarded had to be superior to the right infringed. Prof. Ago himself saw 
the problem in this light169. 
164. For a partial enumeration of the definitions advanced by publicists, see SALMON, "État de 
nécessité", supra, note 146, p. 247-8. 
165. Summary records of the meetings of the 32nd session, 1612th meeting, p. 154, para. 43. 
166. Report of Prof. Ago, p. 19, para. 12. 
167. Report of the Commission, p. 49, par. 32 
168. Id. 
169. Report of Prof. Ago, p. 20, para. 15. 
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However, in the final draft of article 33, the Commission prefered not to 
specifically mention the notion of hierarchy. Nevertheless, it pointed out in its 
commentary that "the interest sacrificed on the altar of necessity must 
obviously be less important than the interest it is thereby sought to save" n o . 
This interpretation is certainly not self-evident from the text of the provision. 
In fact, it seems that the right violated by the acting state can be as "essential" 
as the interest safeguarded, or even more so, as long as the right affected has 
not been "seriously" infringed. 
It is possible, however, to reconcile the interpretation given by the 
Commission and the text of article 33. One can give due weight to both 
considerations by recognizing that, in the appreciation of the relationship 
between the interest safeguarded and the right infringed, the extent of the 
infringement in a particular situation is an important consideration. In 
practice, the more important the right infringed, the less the actual infringement 
should be in order to find that "necessity" is not a sufficient justification in a 
particular case. 
3.2.3. Intervention to Protect Nationals as Justified by Necessity 
The Commission considered the application of the state of necessity in a 
few hypothetical situations. One of its overall concerns was to emphasize that 
the state of necessity was to be invoked very rarely, and that it should remain 
exceptional. 
As regards the wording of the article, the Commission chose to adopt a negative 
form,... ; this was done so in order to show, by formal means also, that the case 
of invocation of the state of necessity as a justification must be considered as 
really constituting an exception. m 
Such an exceptional situation arises when a state is forced to resort to 
armed force in order to rescue its nationals facing extreme danger abroad. In 
such a case, a state will often have no other means of action but an armed 
intervention. Experience shows that consent of the territorial state is sought 
whenever the circumstances demonstrate that the governmental authorities 
will be receptive to the request or that, at least, they have not themselves 
participated in any way in the threat to foreigners. If such consent can or 
could have been obtained, then an eventual unilateral intervention will not be 
justified on the ground of necessity. 
But when authorization to intervene militarily is refused, when the 
circumstances demonstrate that obtaining such consent is futile, or when the 
170. Report of the Commission, p. 50, para. 35. 
171. fd.,p. 51, para. 40. 
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governmental authorities are no longer in effective control of their territory, a 
state is often left with no other practical alternative but to intervene. In such a 
case, the critical question is not whether judicial proceedings are available, 
but whether the nationals are in imminent danger172 : 
In a case involving imminent danger to the lives of captured persons, it would be 
unreasonable to maintain that the continued pursuit of peaceful measures must 
preclude armed rescue action. " 3 
Moreover, the time factor in such operations is of extreme importance : 
speed of action is essential if the operation is to be successful and lives to be 
preserved. 
[...] a failure of peaceful attempts to bring about a solution, leading to a delay in 
the rescue operation, might actually jeopardize it or increase the cost in human 
lives of both combatants and non-combatants. [...] The longer one allows for 
peaceful negotiations [...] the greater the cost of the operation will be. I 7 4 
Nor is the United Nations an alternative : it has proved unable to act with 
the speed requisite to save human lives. In such a situation, a state must either 
sit back and remain idle because of abstract rules of law which prevent any 
forceful action, or undertake a rescue operation, limited in time, in scope and 
in purpose, whereby the means employed are restricted to the elimination of 
the actual danger. 
But, can it be said that the relationship between the interest safeguarded 
and the right infringed is such that it respects the conditions required for 
necessity to preclude wrongfulness of the infringement? Of course, this 
question will always be a matter of appreciation in each individual case. 
However, it is believed that certain fundamental considerations will result in a 
favorable finding in most cases. 
It cannot be denied that a state which intervenes militarily to safeguard 
the life of its threatened nationals is preserving one of its essential interests : 
"population is an essential ingredient of the State"175. This is all the more true 
when international terrorism is behind the threat to a state's nationals: 
blackmail can be directed towards the very survival of the state as a truly 
172. O. SCHACHTER, "The Right of States of Use Armed Force", (1984) 82 Mich. L. R. 1620, 
p. 1631. 
173. Id., p. 1637. 
174. J. WEILER, "Armed Intervention in a Dichotomized World: The Case of Grenada", in 
A. CASSESE (ed.), The Current Regulation of the Use of Force, Dordrecht, 1986, 247, 
p. 250-1. 
175. D. BOWETT, "The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad", supra, note 11, 
p. 41. 
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independent political entity. As a matter of fact, the risks involved and the 
political costs linked with such an intervention ensure that a rescue operation 
will be undertaken only in the most extreme cases, when a state considers it of 
paramount importance to do so. 
But, more importantly, such an operation has as its purpose the safe-
guarding of human rights, a consideration which is of utmost concern to the 
international community. There is no higher value than safeguarding human 
lives l76. 
The existence of a true state of necessity becomes even more undeniable 
when one considers the disparity between the interest upheld and the right 
infringed. Of course, one cannot deny the paramount importance of the 
abstention from the use of force : respect for the territorial integrity and 
political independence of all states is the cardinal rule of the international 
order. But in the present case, the infringement, if infringement there is, is 
minimal, accidental, temporary and without lasting effect. 
The history of international relations exhibits many instances in which intervention 
was prompted by humanitarian considerations that one can condemn only by a 
too vigourous waving of the banners of sovereignty.I77 
The lasting benefits of an intervention designed to save lives and uphold 
human rights outweigh any temporary impairment of the territorial integrity 
of a state. 
In the case of action, assuming it to be successful, the value "human rights" is 
restored and preserved ; the values "international relations free of violence" and 
"territorial integrity" are indeed infringed, but as all the rescue actions mentioned 
in the introduction have demonstrated, it is only a temporary infringement, a 
very short-term use of armed force and on a small scale. After the end of the 
rescue action, not only is the territorial integrity of the target state restored, but 
the international relations are also free of violence again. In respect to these 
values there will be a complete restitutio in integrum. l78 
I therefore come to the conclusion that an intervention to protect 
nationals, if it stays within certain well-defined parameters, can be justified by 
the existence of a state of necessity. And none of the situations which, under 
the Commission's draft article 33(2), exclude the possibility of resorting to 
necessity apply in this case. The most relevant for the purpose of our analysis 
is the one dealing with jus cogens. 
176. SORENSEN, "Principes de droit international public", supra, note 101, p. 220; W. WENGLER, 
"L'interdiction de recourir à la force", [1971] R.B.D.I. 401, p. 417. 
177. R. FALK, "The United Statesand the Doctrine of Nonintervention in the Internal Affairs of 
Independent States", (1959) 5 How. L.J. 163, p. 167. 
178. T. SCHWEISFURTH, "Operations to Rescue Nationals in Third States Involving the Use of 
Force in Relation to the Protection of Human Rights", (1980) 23 G. Y.I.L. 159, p. 177-8. 
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Under the definition of art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties ( 1969)l79, a rule of jus cogens in a norm accepted by the international 
community of states as a whole and recognized as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted. The international community as a whole, i.e. the 
"Western, Communist, Afro-Asia and Latin-American countries"180, must 
therefore be convinced that the rule is binding on all states and that it cannot 
suffer any derogation.181 Judging by the considerable number of States which 
claim that the right of intervention is valid, as well as the numerous writers 
who think likewise, this condition is certainly not fulfilled. 
Since the entry into force of the U.N. Charter, we can count a dozen cases in 
which force has been exerted or at least threatened for the purpose of rescuing 
nationals abroad. Thus, even if one assumes, as we do, that this kind of 
intervention is prohibited by the customary rule forbidding the use of force, it 
cannot be regarded as being in breach of the peremptory rule banning the use of 
force.I82 
The International Law Commission seems to be of the same opinion. If it 
recognized as a peremptory rule of international law the prohibition of 
aggression, it nevertheless made a clear distinction between aggression and 
conduct by a state "which need not be considered as an act of aggression, or 
not, in any case, as a breach of an international obligation of jus cogens"183. 
The Commission had in mind... 
[...] certain actions by States in the territory of other States which, although they 
may sometimes be of a coercive nature, serve only limited intentions and 
purposes bearing no relation to the purposes characteristic of a true act of 
aggression.I84 
Then, the Commission specifically pointed out that intervention to 
protect nationals could fall in that category : 
These would include, for instance, some incursions into foreign territory ... to 
protect the lives of nationals or other persons attacked or detained by hostile 
forces or groups not under the authority and control of the State. I85 
Finally, another argument which shows that an intervention to protect 
nationals does not violate a rule of jus cogens lies in the logical outcome 
179. (1980) 1155 United Nations Treaty Series 332. 
180. N. RONZITTI, "Use of Force, Jus Cogens and State Consent", in A. CASSESE (ed.), The 
Current Regulation of the Use of Force, Dordrecht, 1986, 147, p. 149. 
181. N. RONZITTI, Rescuing Nationals Abroad through Military Coercion and Intervention of 
Grounds of Humanity, Dordrecht, 1985, p. 75. 
182. RONZITTI, "Use of Force", supra, note 180, p. 153. 
183. Report of the Commission, p. 44, par. 23. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
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linked with the opposite conclusion. A peremptory rule of international law 
cannot be derogated from : consent of the state whose rights have been 
violated cannot operate as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness.I86 Therefore, 
if an intervention to protect nationals constituted a violation of a rule of jus 
cogens, the territorial state's consent to it would be an irrelevant consideration 
in the assessment of the legality of the operation. However, there is unanimity 
among states and writers that an intervention by consent is legal, by virtue of 
that consent alone l87. It therefore goes to show that the exception contained 
in art. 33(2)(a) is not applicable to force used to protect nationals. 
Nor is art. 33(2)(b), which stipulates that necessity will not apply if it is 
expressly or implicitly prohibited by a treaty. Some scholars have often 
maintained that force can be legitimately used in international law only if it is 
expressly authorized by the Charter. Could it therefore be maintained that 
necessity as a justification for the use of force is implicitly prohibited by the 
Charter, because of the absence of any specific mention of it ? 
The International Court of Justice's decision in the Nicaragua Case 
(1986) has demonstrated that this reasoning is incorrect. As we have mentioned 
previously, the Court examined the relationship between the Charter and 
customary international law regarding the use of force. And the Court found 
that the "United Nations Charter [...] by no means covers the whole area of 
the regulation of the use of force in international relations"l88. Since the 
Charter does not represent the whole body of law regulating use of force, its 
failure to refer explicitly to necessity does not mean that necessity cannot 
legitimize a use of force : the exception found in art. 33(2)(b) is therefore not 
applicable in the present case. 
3.2.4. Necessity and State Practice 
Overall, the concept of necessity as applied to armed intervention 
remains very abstract, since relevant state practice is nearly non-existent. The 
majority of cases when states have actually invoked necessity as an excuse for 
the violation of their international obligations have been linked mostly with 
financial obligations, or with the use of force. Most of the latter cases are, 
186. RONZITTI, "Use of Force", supra, note 180, p. 148. 
187. See, inter alia, C. ROUSSEAU, Droit international public, vol. IV, Paris, 1980, p. 47; 
R. LILI ICH, "Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights", (1967) 53 Iowa L. R. 
325, p. 349; I. BROWNLIE, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford, 1963, 
p. 317 ; RONZITTI, Rescuing Nationals Abroad, supra, note 1, p. 84. 
188. Case concerning United States Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 
[1986] I.C.J.Rep. 3, p. 94, para. 176. 
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however, irrelevant for the purposes of our analysis, since they represented 
outright acts of aggression in pre-Charter days. 
When it comes to intervention to protect nationals, state practice is 
abundant, but confusing. Sometimes, states refer to a right of self-defence to 
justify their actions, sometimes they refer to a self-standing right. In only one 
case, the 1960 Belgian intervention in Congo, has a state mentioned necessity 
as a justification for its action l89. And even in that case, the statements of the 
Belgian government were not precise, were confused, and alluded more to the 
self-standing right approach than to the concept of necessity: the term 
"necessity" was used more in its ordinary meaning than as a legal concept. 19° 
Statements by third states about necessity as a justification for a rescue 
operation are just as scarce. In 1976, the government of the Netherlands 
found that the Israeli rescue operation in Uganda was justified by what the 
Dutch Foreign Minister called "a state of emergency"l91, but with no further 
explanation. And during the debates in the General Assembly sixth committee 
concerning the draft articles on state responsibility submitted by the International 
Law Commission, very few precise comments were made on the relationship 
between intervention to protect nationals and necessity. It seems that only 
Rumania clearly stated its position, refusing to allow necessity as an excuse to 
a rescue operationl92. 
Nevertheless, it is believed that necessity as a legal concept has a place in 
international law and should be invoked by states, whenever the right factual 
circumstances are present, to justify use of force to rescue their nationals 
facing an imminent danger. Necessity as a legal concept overcomes not only 
the difficulties raised by relying on a vision of self-defence which seems 
overstretched, out-dated and conceptually incorrect : it also seems preferable 
to the concept of intervention as a self-standing right. 
The concept of intervention for the protection of nationals as a self-
standing right will always remain subject to criticism because of its very 
reliance on a textual interpretation of the Charter. Necessity, on the other 
hand, recognizes that certain international obligations are violated whenever 
189. Report of the Commission, p. 45, para. 25. 
190. See the statement of the Belgian Prime Minister, Mr. Eyskens, to the Belgian Senate, on 
July 12th 1960, as quoted in SALMON, "État de Nécessité", supra, note 146, p. 252 ; see the 
statements of the Belgian representative to the Security Council in U. N. S. C. O.R.,\ 5th year, 
I960, S/PV. 873, 873rd meeting, p. 34, para. 182-4, p. 35, para. 192-3 and S/PV. 877, 
877th meeting, p. 30, para. 142. 
191. As quoted in K. SIK and R. SIEKMAN, "Netherlands State Practice for the Parliamentary 
Year 1976", (1978) 9 Neth. Y.I.L. 191, p. 234. 
192. RONZITTI, Rescuing Nationals Abroad, supra, note 1, p. 51. 
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a state uses force onto another state's foreign territory ; but, at the same time, 
it takes into account the fact that, in certain situations, a state has no other 
choice but to act in disregard of international law. Indeed, necessity is a 
concept closer to the present reality of the international legal order and more 
in conformity with state behaviour since 1945. Moreover, necessity possesses 
the undisputable advantage of being a flexible concept, which will adapt itself 
to the varying circumstances of an ever changing international community. 
Conclusion 
In this article, it has been demonstrated that intervention to protect 
nationals has a place in international law, may it be as a self-standing right or 
as an exception to the prohibition of the use of force. Studying the concept of 
self-standing right, I have shown that the arguments supporting intervention 
to protect nationals are preponderant, since those negating its existence rest 
on tenuous grounds. 
Recognizing, however, that there is no clear-cut conclusion to that 
doctrinal controversy, attention has been turned to the view that intervention 
to protect nationals constitutes an illegal use of force, which is nevertheless 
exceptionally justified. In that respect, self-defence has been ruled out as a 
solution, in spite of the state practice related to it : it is preferable to rely on 
another concept, "necessity", which provides an excuse precluding wrongfulness 
of the action. 
However, in the end, whatever concept one chooses to espouse, either the 
self-standing right approach or the state of necessity approach, it all boils 
down to an overriding concern of bringing international law closer to the 
reality of the international community. 
It cannot be denied that states do use force to protect nationals ; and they 
do it because they have no other choice. This is not to say that art. 2(4) of the 
Charter is a dead letter ; however we need to recognize that the whole system 
of the regulation of the use of force set up by the Charter is very ill. And it is 
not by maintaining an idealistic vision of a contemporary world ruled by a 
legal order prohibiting unilateral recourse to forceful coercion that one will 
bring back life into it. 
Of course, 1 share the same desire of every individual of peace and 
harmony between nations. And international law can play a role in the 
fulfillment ofthat objective by setting up rules which represent ways to attain 
it. However, one could do no greater disservice to the advancement of the 
international legal order than to set up the content of these rules in such an 
abstract way that they become mere ideals : ideals to which states will pay lip-
service, but which do not in any way take into account the state of the 
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international community. By maintaining that any unilateral use of force is 
prohibited, the Charter system and the whole body of international law itself 
is and will be brought into disrepute. I cannot but agree with Prof. Stone's 
conclusion : 
If we persist in representing to the ordinary people of the world that the Charter 
contains strict and firm rules of law forbidding war, then insofar as daily events 
show these rules to be illusory, we invite a massive impatience and cynicism not 
only with these supposed rules, but with other United Nations functions and 
organs and with international law generally. "3 
As I said, states do it and they will keep on doing it because they have no 
other choice. International law, and the international community in general, 
will be better served by a legal regime of the use of force which allows for 
unilateral use of armed coercion in certain well-defined situations. This will 
correspond much more to the present needs of the internatioal community 
and its members, and will ensure that respect for the rule of law is enhanced. 
Indeed, in the long run, international law will be better equipped to influence 
state behaviour in such a way as to bring about its most fundamental, but up 
to now very illusive, objective : the establishment of a world in peace and truly 
free from violence. 
193. J. STONE, Of Law and Nations, Buffalo, 1974, p. 36-7. 
